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INTRODUCTION 
Seemingly benign questions of statutory interpretation sometimes reveal 
important insights about the meaning of the law. A famous example is the “No 
Vehicles in the Park” hypothetical.1 Is a person driving an emergency vehicle 
in the park intending to save the life of an accident victim violating the ordi-
nance? Answering the question requires interpreting the plain language mean-
ing and intent of the ordinance: does the term of art “car” include an “emergen-
cy vehicle?” Does the ordinance intend to ensure the safety of park visitors, 
such that it makes sense to exempt from its application an emergency vehicle 
driven in circumstances meant to save a life because the purpose of the ordi-
nance is pursued?2 Notably, addressing these inquires entails a lot more than 
mastering the tools of statutory interpretation. Rather, the questions tease out 
complex insights about the difference between bright-line rules and open-ended 
standards as well as jurisprudential choices between formalism with its vision 
of law as a closed, self-contained independent system, and realism and its 
commitment to paying attention to context and an understanding of law as a 
dynamic ever-evolving system.3 
In-house pay, and specifically, whether in-house salaries, bonuses, stock 
grants, stock options, and nonmonetary benefits are a “fee” subject to a reason-
ableness requirement,4 turns out to be yet another example of an ostensibly be-
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Pepper, Joyce Sterling, Steven Vaughan, Brad Wendel, and David Wilkins for their com-
ments and Diane Burkhardt, Faculty Services Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law for her outstanding research assistance. 
1  H. L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
607 (1958). The hypothetical has been referred to as “the most famous hypothetical in the 
common law world.” Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2008), and the “chestnut of legal debates about statutory interpreta-
tion.”; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for 
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1255 (2015). 
2  For a similar formulation, see Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the 
-law-textual-originalism [https://perma.cc/S9HW-UUPD]. (“Does an ordinance that says that 
‘no person may bring a vehicle into the park’ apply to an ambulance that enters the park to 
save a person’s life?”). 
3  See Hart, supra note 1, at 606–08. 
4  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) holds that attorneys’ 
fees are subject to a reasonableness requirement. It states in relevant part: “[a] lawyer shall 
not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee . . . .” Id. A vast majority 
of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted Rule 1.5(a). See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY 
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nign question of statutory interpretation, which reveals important insights about 
the meaning of law, law practice and the future of attorney regulation. Constru-
ing the plain language meaning of the word “fee” and the various rationales for 
the traditional reasonableness requirement imposed on attorneys’ fees in the 
context of in-house practice teases out important insights about the evolving 
regulation and role of in-house counsel and lawyers more generally. 
Moreover, understanding in-house pay entails delving into the rise of a 
class of lawyer-employees, of which in-house lawyers are but a small subset, 
and unearthing regulatory tensions and questions “at the intersection of judicial 
power over the practice of law and legislative power over the conditions of em-
ployment.”5 These questions include whether the judiciary or the legislature 
should regulate lawyers and whether all lawyers should be subject to the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules). Understanding in-house pay also neces-
sitates acknowledging the emergence of lawyer-businesspersons, of which in-
house counsel are but one example, for whom law is not the core of what they 
do but only a part of their roles and job descriptions. Together, the lawyer-
employee and the lawyer-businessperson models challenge the long-standing 
dominant paradigm of the lawyer-professional, the foundation of law practice, 
and the regulation of lawyers as we know them. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I offers, for the first time, a statu-
tory interpretation of the Rules that impose a reasonableness requirement on 
attorneys’ fees in the context of in-house pay. Following a thorough analysis of 
the meaning, intent, and various rationales of intersecting rules, it concludes 
that in-house pay is subject to the traditional reasonableness requirement im-
posed on fees, and then offers a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of rea-
sonableness as applied to in-house counsel. 
The rest of the Article explores the consequences and meaning of this nov-
el interpretation for in-house lawyers, the profession and the Rules. Part II ex-
amines the rise of the lawyer-employee paradigm, of which in-house lawyers 
are a subset. It shows that while in-house counsel are employees and therefore 
part and parcel of the new lawyer-employees class, they are, importantly, pow-
erful employees, more akin to income partners and law firm associates, as op-
posed to the more typical weak lawyer-employee paradigm, exemplified by 
staff, temporary, and outsourced lawyers. It concludes that as powerful em-
ployees, in-house lawyers should be subject to regulations applicable to lawyer-
professionals, such as the reasonableness requirement imposed on in-house 
pay; but that in general, the Rules ought to be carefully scrutinized before they 
are applied to the new class of weak lawyer-employees. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT, RULE 1.5: FEES (2018), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/a 
ba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/82W6-GXR7]. 
5  Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (Chism was the 
first case in the U.S. to examine whether in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness re-
quirement). 
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Part III explores in-house lawyers as an example of lawyer-
businesspersons. It shows that similar to the rise of the lawyer-employee, the 
emergence of the lawyer-businessperson model raises important questions 
about the future of the regulation of the legal profession, as well as the regula-
tion of nonlawyers who provide legal services. Finally, the Conclusion explains 
why the rise of the lawyer-employee paradigm and the emergence of the law-
yer-businessperson model as alternatives to the dominant lawyer-professional 
ideal are important developments not only for in-house counsel and lawyers 
generally but to nonlawyers as well, including clients, legal service providers, 
and the public. 
I. REGULATING IN-HOUSE PAY AS A (COMPLEX) DOCTRINAL QUESTION 
Rule 1.5(a) states in relevant part: “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement 
for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee . . . .”6 Does in-house pay, including 
salary, bonuses, stock grants and options, and nonmonetary benefits, constitute 
a “fee” subject to a reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a)? 
A. Reasonableness: Attorneys’ Fees and In-House Pay 
In Chism v. Tri-State Construction Inc.7, a Washington state court of ap-
peals confronted the issue for the first time.8 In the case, Mr. Chism, Tri-State 
Construction Inc.’s (Tri-State) general counsel, sued Tri-State for breach of 
compensation contracts to recover allegedly unpaid bonuses.9 Tri-State coun-
terclaimed, asserting that Mr. Chism’s compensation contracts violated the 
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (Wash. RPC) and were void as 
against public policy.10 Specifically, Tri-State argued inter alia that the com-
pensation contracts violated Wash. RPC Rules 1.5 and 1.8 because they were 
unreasonable.11 
The trial court found that Tri-State breached the compensation contracts 
and willfully withheld Mr. Chism’s bonuses,12 and dismissed Tri-State’s Rule 
1.5 counterclaim.13 However, the trial court held that Mr. Chism violated Rules 
1.7 and 1.8 in part because the bonuses in question were unreasonable, and dis-
gorged more than half of his unpaid bonuses.14 The court of appeals avoided 
the substantive question of whether in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness 
 
6  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
7  Chism, 374 P.3d at 207. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. at 202. 
10  Id. 
11  See id. Tri-State also argued that the compensation packages violated Washington Rules 
of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7 and 1.8 because they gave rise to prohibited conflicts of 
interest. Id. at 207, 209. 
12  Id. at 202. 
13  Id. at 202, 206. 
14  Id. at 203. 
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requirement, reversing the disgorgement on two procedural grounds.15 First, the 
appellate court held that the Washington Supreme Court’s disciplinary authori-
ty over Washington attorneys is “plenary.”16 Because the issue of the reasona-
bleness of in-house pay was a matter of first impression for the Washington 
Supreme Court, the trial court lacked the authority to discipline Mr. Chism and 
disgorge his bonuses.17 Second and relatedly, because the construction of the 
Wash. RPC with regard to in-house pay was novel, the rules were vague and 
their interpretation would only apply prospectively, that is, they could not ret-
roactively apply to Mr. Chism’s conduct.18 Thus, the fundamental substantive 
issue—whether in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness requirement—has 
remained undecided. 
1. The Plain Language of Rule 1.5(a)’s Reasonableness Requirement 
Like the rules in a vast majority of the states, Wash. RPC Rule 1.5(a) fol-
lows Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules and states in relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall 
not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee.”19 Rule 
1.5(a) thus imposes a mandatory reasonableness requirement on lawyers’ fees. 
Does the term of art “fee” in rule 1.5(a) encompass in-house pay, including sal-
aries, bonuses, stock grants, stock options, and nonmonetary benefits? 
In Chism, Tri-State made this very claim. The trial court dismissed the 
claim at the summary judgment stage, finding that as a matter of law a “fee” 
was different than “wages” and “bonuses,” and that accordingly Rule 1.5(a)’s 
reasonableness requirement did not apply to in-house pay. It concluded that 
“[Mr. Chism’s] status as in house counsel renders the disgorgement of fees . . . 
based on alleged violations of RPC 1.5 unavailable. . . .”20 The court of appeals 
affirmed. Following the conventions of judicial interpretation of statutory lan-
guage, it held that “[w]hen interpreting the meaning of any RPC, . . . [o]ur goal 
is to give effect to the intent behind the rule, which we discern, where possible, 
from the plain language of the rule at issue in the context of the RPCs as a 
whole.”21 Construing the intent behind Rule 1.5(a), the court of appeals looked 
to the plain language meaning of the word “fee” and held that “Tri-State’s ar-
gument equivocates between ‘fees,’ the explicit object of the rule, and ‘wages,’ 
the type of compensation here at issue. This is contrary to the plain meaning 
and common usage of the words.”22 
With due respect to the Chism courts, the interpretive issue here is much 
more complex than they acknowledged it to be as neither the Rules, nor the Re-
 
15  Id. at 215. 
16  Id. at 205. 
17  Id. at 208–09. 
18  Id. at 206, 209. 
19  Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (2015), with MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
20  Chism, 374 P.3d at 207 (internal citations omitted). 
21  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
22  Id. 
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statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (2000) (Restatement), define 
the term “fee.” On the one hand, the word “fee” is not identical to “compensa-
tion”, “wages,” “salary,” “bonus,” “stock grant,” “stock option,” or “nonmone-
tary benefits.” Moreover, as noted by the Chism court of appeals, the common 
usage of these terms is not identical because “fees” tend to suggest payment for 
legal services by a client in an attorney-client professional relationship, where-
as the other terms imply payment for services by an employer in an employee-
employer relationship.23 Yet this seemingly clear distinction begs the question 
here, where the client is an employer and the lawyer is an employee. 
Relatedly, perhaps the court of appeals meant to invoke the classic agency 
law distinction between independent contractors and employees,24 suggesting 
that “fees” denote payment for the former whereas the other terms of art reflect 
payment to the latter. This distinction too, however, is unhelpful in the context 
of in-house lawyers. In a traditional independent contractor-principal relation-
ship, the principal controls only the objectives of the relationship; whereas in 
an employer-employee relationship the employer controls both the objectives 
and the manner in which they are to be pursued by the employee.25 This legal 
definition, however, does not fit the practice realities of in-house lawyers: 
while they are certainly employees of their entity-clients, in-house lawyer-
employees exercise ample control over the manner in which they represent 
their clients, and the entity-client-employers do not purport to control the man-
ner in which their in-house lawyers practice law on their behalf.26 In this sense, 
in-house lawyers, although technically employees, resemble independent con-
tractors who exercise control over the manner in which they pursue their tasks. 
Thus, defining fees to denote the compensation of independent contractors such 
as outside counsel and the other terms of art to refer to the compensation of 
employees such as in-house lawyers begs the question. 
On the other hand, a standard definition of attorneys’ fees is “the payment 
for legal services,”27 and in-house pay, both a salary and overall compensation, 
is clearly a payment for legal services.28 Furthermore, the Restatement states 
 
23  Id. at n.22. 
24  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
25  See, e.g., Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214, 214–16 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965); Humble 
Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 222 S.W.2d 995, 998 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1949); Murphy v. Holiday 
Inns, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874, 875, 878 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
26  As Sung Hui Kim has shown, rather than directly control the manner in which their in-
house lawyers practice, entity clients put in place an “ethical ecology” introducing obedi-
ence, alignment and conformity pressures intended to incentivize in-house counsel to act as 
“mere employee[s],” “faithful agent[s]” and “team player[s].” See Sung Hui Kim, The Ba-
nality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 
1001, 1008, 1019, 1034 (2005) [hereinafter Kim, The Banality of Fraud]. 
27  Attorney’s Fee, FREEDICTIONARY.COM, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com 
/Attorney+fee [https://perma.cc/EY2V-8RFC] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
28  Notably, most definitions list as examples of fees hourly, flat, contingency, statutory, 
court-approved and combinations of these arrangements, and not salary or compensation. 
See id. 
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that “[t]he prohibition on unreasonable payment arrangements is not limited to 
fees in a narrow sense,”29 and appears to construe “fees” broadly as a synonym 
of compensation, for example, by noting that “[t]his Section forbids unlawful 
fees and unreasonably large fees, while leaving clients and lawyers free to ne-
gotiate a broad range of compensation terms,”30 suggesting that “fees” ought to 
be construed broadly enough to encompass salaries and bonuses of lawyer-
employees. 
Revealingly, the court of appeals’ own textual analysis proves the inherent 
ambiguity of the term “fee” as applied to in-house pay. Quoting Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary’s definitions of “fee” and “wage,” the court of appeals 
reasoned: “[i]n short, ‘wage’ presupposes an ongoing employer-employee rela-
tionship, whereas ‘fee’ suggests retaining a professional on a temporary basis 
for a specific, limited purpose.”31 Yet, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines a 
“fee” as “compensation . . . for professional service,” which applies to in-house 
pay; and the court’s reasoning does not resolve the issue: whereas “wage” pre-
supposes an ongoing employer-employee relationship, a “fee” does not neces-
sarily suggest a temporary, limited attorney-client relationship. Rather, some 
lawyers charge clients fees while engaged in ongoing, permanent, stable attor-
ney-client relationships.32 
The difficulty of discerning the intent of Rule 1.5(a) from its plain lan-
guage, and, in particular, whether “fee” encompasses in-house pay, is not sur-
prising. The Rules, inclusive of Rule 1.5(a), were adopted in 1983,33 when the 
transformation of in-house practice was in its infancy. One “of the most signifi-
cant changes in corporate legal practice in the United States,”34 indeed, a “strik-
ing development,”35 has been the rise to prominence of in-house lawyers, and, 
in particular, of general counsel of large entity organizations over the last fifty 
years. Once upon a time “castigated,”36 belittled as “house counsel,”37 and per-
 
29  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34, cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
30  Id. 
31  Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 207 n.22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). 
32  Historically, the typical relationship between large law firms and their large entity clients 
used to be ongoing, permanent, and stable. The relatively recent erosion of these permanent 
long-term relationships has been a source of great distress for BigLaw; See David B. Wil-
kins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2080–84 (2010) [hereinafter Wilkins, Team of Rivals?]. 
33  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards Chair’s Introduction) (describing the evolution of Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct). 
34  Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global 
Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057 (1997). 
35  Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985). 
36  Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organiza-
tional Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 479 (1989). 
37  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 
1011–12 (1997). 
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ceived to be lawyers “who had not quite made the grade as partner[s],”38 Gen-
eral counsel now “sit[] close to the top of the corporate hierarchy as [] mem-
ber[s] of senior management,”39 having gained power, prestige and respect.40 
This transformation was beginning to take place in the mid-1970s, and was not 
reflected in the Rules.41 
In-house pay reflects this profound transformation. Whereas through the 
mid-1970s in-house lawyers were paid relatively low salaries reflecting their 
low status, their rise to power and influence has corresponded with significantly 
higher compensation. For example, in 2017, the average salary of the 100 gen-
eral counsel with the highest cash compensation was $717,183, the average 
overall compensation of these general counsel was $2,028,221, and the highest 
paid general counsel brought home $6,948,750.42 Given this profound trans-
formation of in-house pay, it is thus hardly surprising that in the mid to late 
1970s when the Rules were being drafted and debated, little attention was given 
to the issue. Put differently, legislative history is unhelpful here because at most 
it shows not that the American Bar Association (ABA) considered a broad def-
inition of “fees” and rejected it but rather that it did not contemplate the possi-
bility of salaries being a subset of fees. Moreover, the plain language of a rule 
must be interpreted in the context of the Rules as a whole,43 which are rules of 
reason.44 Accordingly, even if the ABA had considered that possibility, in-
house practice realities have changed so radically between the 1970s and early 
1980s and now that such analysis would be outdated. 
In any event, given the going rates of in-house pay, the issue of whether it 
is subject to reasonableness constraint is both topical and timely. Because the 
 
38  Chayes & Chayes, supra note 35, at 277. Although, as Carl Liggio astutely points out, 
BigLaw was hard at work perpetuating this perception. Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role 
of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1203 (1997). 
39  Chayes & Chayes, supra note 35, at 277. 
40  Hazard, supra note 37, at 1011–12; Rosen, supra note 36, at 479. 
41  The American Bar Association formed the Commission on Evaluation of Professional 
Standards in 1977 to undertake a comprehensive review of the Model Code, the then appli-
cable rules of professional conduct. The Commission conducted a six-year review and rec-
ommended the adoption of the new Model Rules, which the House of Delegates approved in 
1983. The in-house transformation was still in its infancy and therefore could not and did not 
play any meaningful role in the Commission’s recommendations. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards 
Chair’s Introduction). 
42  Caroline Spiezio, The 2018 GC Compensation Survey: A New No. 1, CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 
1, 2018), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/08/01/cc-mag-080118-fea-cover/?slreturn 
=20190816011321 [https://perma.cc/ZQB3-3BGE] follow the click through link to: htt 
ps://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=fddb70a0-d925-4602-b7e4-738e295c7cbd&pdsearch 
terms=LNSDUID-ALMCORPCMgmd45ejgei&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=100 
0516&pdisurlapi=true [https://perma.cc/K83H-Q9FN]. 
43  Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). 
44  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE cmt. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“The Rules of 
Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the 
purposes of legal representation and of the law itself.”). 
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plain language of Rule 1.5(a) and its legislative history are not dispositive when 
it comes to in-house pay, one must turn to the intent behind the Rule.45 
2. The Intent of Rule 1.5(a)’s Reasonableness Requirement 
The comments to Rule 1.5 and the Restatement reveal four intersecting ra-
tionales for the reasonableness requirement: client protection, increased access 
to legal services, professionalism and fiduciary duties. 
a. Client Protection 
The Restatement explains that the reasonableness requirement in Rule 
1.5(a) is designed to protect clients, and, in particular, vulnerable unsophisticat-
ed clients, from lawyer abuse. The Restatement notes: “A client-lawyer fee ar-
rangement will be set aside when its provisions are unreasonable as to the cli-
ent. . . . Courts are concerned to protect clients, particularly those who are 
unsophisticated in matters of lawyers’ compensation, when a lawyer has over-
reached,”46 and adds: “[i]nformation about fees for legal services is often diffi-
cult for prospective clients to obtain. Many clients do not bargain effectively 
because of their need and inexperience.”47 This rationale is also reflected in 
various statutory provisions imposing limitations on lawyers’ fees meant to 
protect vulnerable clients.48 
Notably, the client protection rationale does not aim to shield clients from a 
few abusive “bad apple” lawyers. Rather, it guards against excesses inherent in 
day-to-day interactions between ordinary lawyers and ordinary clients. Clients 
seek out lawyers when they have legal needs,49 needs that are often stressful 
 
45  RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 1–2 (2012) (“[L]egislative intent 
has traditionally been thought to be the central object of statutory interpretation.”); WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14 (1994) (“Anglo-American 
scholars from early modern times to the present have argued that original intent is and 
should be the cornerstone of statutory interpretation.”); See Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary 
Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1110–11 
(noting that proponents of various statutory interpretation schools of thought, including Pur-
posivism and Pragmatism, acknowledge the central role of intent in statutory interpretation). 
46  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
47  Id. 
48  Statutory restrictions or caps on attorneys’ fees are common in medical malpractice, vet-
erans’ rights, and workers’ compensation representations, see Sachi Barreiro, How Much 
Will a Workers’ Compensation Lawyer Cost?, ALLLAW, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/ 
nolo/workers-compensation/lawyer-cost-fees.html [https://perma.cc/MC8M-B7EN] (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2019); Medicaid Liability/Medical Malpractice 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical- 
liability-or-malpractice-2011-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/CJM9-6QH7] (last updated 
Aug. 15, 2012); The Fees Which May Be Charged by an Agent or Attorney, NAT’L ORG. 
VETERANS’ ADVOCS., INC., https://www.vetadvocates.org/cpages/fees-which-may-be-charge 
d-by-agent-attorney [https://perma.cc/Q8P7-3PKS] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
49  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
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and embarrassing. Clients are frequently eager to retain lawyers and address 
these problems and are therefore less likely to effectively negotiate with law-
yers over fees. This rationale is especially applicable to unsophisticated clients 
who in addition to dealing with the stress caused by legal needs are not used to 
dealing with lawyers. Moreover, information about fees is not readily availa-
ble,50 and clients’ inexperience in dealing with lawyers compounds their inef-
fective fee negotiations. As a result, fee negotiations may regularly result in un-
reasonable fees but for the objective reasonableness requirement imposed by 
Rule 1.5(a). 
On a quick read, one may be tempted to promptly dismiss the client protec-
tion rationale as inapplicable to entity-clients and their in-house lawyers, and 
indeed, the rationale poorly fits a subset of entity clients. Large entity clients 
likely do not need the protection of the Rules, because they tend to be sophisti-
cated and have ample information about fees and legal services that they in-
creasingly use to negotiate favorable fee terms vis-à-vis outside and inside 
counsel.51 In particular, a large entity client is likely not vulnerable vis-à-vis its 
in-house counsel: it has experienced executives negotiating on its behalf, and 
often has other in-house lawyers and outside counsel at its service.52 Some mid-
size entity clients may similarly not be vulnerable to in-house lawyers: a deci-
sion to hire an in-house lawyer may follow interactions with outside counsel 
and be driven in part by a desire to reduce the cost of legal services, indicating 
that the clients are relatively savvy and knowledgeable about in-house pay.53 
Yet the kneejerk reaction to overlook the client protection rationale as ap-
plied to in-house lawyers ought to be resisted, however, because other entity-
clients are in need and will benefit from the client protection rationale as evi-
denced by the facts of Chism. Mr. Chism was an in-house lawyer and general 
counsel of Tri-State, having previously served as Tri-State’s outside counsel, 
was its source of legal advice and counsel, and the small family entity and its 
authorized constituents were arguably vulnerable to him, a claim they explicitly 
made in the litigation.54 More generally, many small and mid-size entities may 
be unsophisticated in matters of lawyers’ compensation and have little access to 
information about in-house salaries or the ability to reasonably analyze it, un-
dercutting their ability to effectively negotiate a reasonable compensation 
package. Put differently, while large entity-clients are likely not in need of pro-
 
50  Bar associations used to maintain minimum fee schedules, which provided information 
about fees, an uncompetitive practice disallowed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See Richard Abel, The Transformation of 
the American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 7-12 (1986).  
51  See generally Rosen, supra note 36, at 479, 483–84; Wilkins, supra note 32, at 2081–84. 
52  Id. 
53  David Wilkins dubs this the “economic” claim of the in-house counsel movement, see, 
David B. Wilkins, The In-House Counsel Movement, Metrics of Change, LEGAL BUS. 
WORLD (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.legalbusinessworld.com/single-post/2017/01/20/The-In 
-House-Counsel-Movement-Metrics-of-Change. 
54  Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 196–201 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (Tri-State 
argued that Mr. Chism took advantage of its ailing president to obtain his bonuses). 
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tection from their in-house counsel, organizational clients are not a monolith. 
Using large sophisticated powerful corporations as a proxy for the entire uni-
verse of entity-clients to conclude that all entity-clients are not vulnerable to 
their in-house counsel and not in need of protection would be simplistic and in-
accurate. 
The inconclusive nature of the client protection rationale as applied to in-
house lawyers reveals profound insights about contemporary law practice and 
its regulation: context matters and traditional hierarchies and boundaries are in-
creasingly being blurred, rendering a universal predictable interpretation of the 
Rules a daunting task. To begin with, elite general counsel of large-entity cli-
ents have become, over the last fifty years or so, some of the most powerful 
lawyers in the legal profession.55 Yet, at the same time, their employers and the 
employers’ authorized constituents such as CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are 
as, if not more, powerful and sophisticated as their general counsel and do not 
need the reasonableness protection of Rule 1.5(a). Thus, ironically and counter-
intuitively, the most powerful in-house lawyers are likely not in a position to 
abuse their clients in the context of pay negotiations. Many other general coun-
sel and in-house lawyers, who may not be as powerful as their elite counter-
parts, are nonetheless quite powerful vis-à-vis their small entity-clients, which 
may benefit from the client protection rationale.56 
Thus, it is not necessarily the most powerful in-house counsel that pose the 
most threat to their (equally if not more powerful) clients. Rather, it is the 
somewhat less powerful in-house lawyers, those practicing in small in-house 
legal departments serving small or relatively unsophisticated entity-clients, who 
may be able to take advantage of their clients. This mirrors a similar trend out-
side of the in-house sphere. Whereas BigLaw equity partners are considered 
some of the most powerful elite within the legal profession, they represent 
some of the most powerful and sophisticated entity clients who can protect their 
own interests. In contrast, solo practitioners who within the profession benefit 
from lower prestige, tend to exercise greater power and influence vis-à-vis their 
individual relatively unsophisticated clients.57 
Moreover, the very vulnerability of some corporate entity clients reflects 
the blurring of the traditional boundary within the legal profession between the 
corporate hemisphere with its powerful and sophisticated entity clients and the 
 
55  Supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
56  On the importance of context and the danger inherent in applying universal assumptions 
about the identity of lawyers and their clients to an increasingly diverse legal profession, see 
David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal 
Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 72–74 (Sarat et al. eds. 1998) 
[hereinafter Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case]. 
57  See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
LARGE LAW FIRM (1988) (documenting the complex practice realities of large law firm part-
ner who are at the same time powerful within their law firms and the profession but not nec-
essarily vis-à-vis their entity clients); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autono-
my: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 213, 225 (1991) (examining the dominant 
position of seemingly powerless lawyers with respect to their individual clients).  
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individual hemisphere with its individual vulnerable clients.58 Several trends, 
including increased mobility, the rise of information technology, the use of un-
bundling and repackaging of legal tasks, the deregulation of organizational 
forms through which law can be practiced, and globalization have combined to 
destabilize the hemispheres, which no longer accurately reflect the complex 
practice realities of the twenty-first century.59 The end result is this: one can no 
longer simply assume that entity-clients do not need protection from in-house 
lawyers or that the most powerful in-house lawyers pose the most threat of ne-
gotiating unreasonable pay with their clients. Instead, some entity clients occu-
pying space in the corporate hemisphere may nonetheless be vulnerable vis-à-
vis their in-house lawyers. 
That the client protection rationale applies well to some entity clients and 
poorly to others is a function of two interrelated features of in-house practice: 
the great range of entity clients in size, needs and organization; and the growing 
variety of in-house lawyers, tasks and roles, juxtaposed against the insistence of 
the Rules on regulating all in-house counsel, and indeed, all lawyers, with a 
one-size-fits-all universal code of conduct.60 The wisdom of this approach not-
withstanding,61 as long as it continues to be the prevailing regulatory method 
deployed by the ABA, it strongly suggests extending the client protection ra-
 
58  On the individual and corporate hemispheres of the legal profession, see JOHN P. HEINZ & 
EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319–20 
(1982) (finding that the legal profession consists of two categories of lawyers whose practice 
settings, socioeconomic and ethno-religious backgrounds, education, and clientele differ 
considerably); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
BAR 30–31, 44 (2005) (documenting that lawyers work in two fairly distinct hemispheres—
individual and corporate—and that mobility between these hemispheres is relatively lim-
ited). 
59  David B. Wilkins, Some Realism About Legal Realism for Lawyers: Assessing the Role of 
Contest in Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 
25, 33–38 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) [hereinafter Wilkins, Some Realism 
About Legal Realism]. 
60  Universalism has long been a key feature of the regulation of American lawyers. See, e.g., 
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Introduction to AM. BAR ASS’N, A CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS: 
TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, at xxix (Lawrence J. Fox 
et al. eds., 2009) (“Looking back—briefly—at the history of legal ethics governance in the 
United States, a number of broad themes emerge . . . [among them] uniform rules or stand-
ards applicable to all or most attorneys”). The 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics stat-
ed their universal premise explicitly, declaring that: “The canons of the American Bar Asso-
ciation apply to all branches of the legal profession; specialists in particular branches are not 
to be considered as exempt from the application of these principles.” STEPHEN GILLERS ET 
AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2017) (quoting A.B.A., CANONS 
OF PROF’L ETHICS, Canon 45 (1963)) (emphasis added). The 1969 ABA Model Code, which 
replaced the Canons, similarly stated that: “the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly ap-
plied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities.” MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969). 
61  Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 227, 230, 
251–52, 257 (2014) [hereinafter Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct] (criticiz-
ing the Rules’ one-size-fits-all approach for institutionalizing implicit bias against women 
and minority lawyers and calling for the adoption of a regulatory mode sensitive to contem-
porary practice realities and a diverse legal profession). 
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tionale to all clients, including the subset of large and sophisticated entity-
clients who may not need it. As the Chism and many other courts explain, “the 
plain language of the rule at issue” must be interpreted “in the context of the 
RPCs as a whole.”62 Given the Rules’ insistence on a one-size-fits-all regulato-
ry approach and their overall objective of client protection,63 in case of some 
doubt, or, more accurately, when in the face of growing client and lawyer di-
verse identities, the Rules may over protect some clients and under protect oth-
ers, the Rules ought to err on the side of client protection and impose the rea-
sonableness requirement on all attorneys, in-house lawyers included. 
b. Increased Access to Legal Services 
Next, the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) is explained in terms 
of increasing access to legal services: “the availability of legal services is often 
essential if people of limited means are to enjoy legal rights. Those seeking to 
vindicate their rights through the private bar should not be deterred by the risk 
of unwarranted fee burdens.”64 Thus, the Restatement’s increased access to le-
gal services rationale contains two intertwined strands. To increase access to 
law and lawyers by people of limited means, “reasonableness” means “low” 
fees such that people of limited means can afford them.65 To increase access for 
those who seek to vindicate legal rights, “reasonableness” means “warranted” 
fees.66 Neither strand applies with force to in-house lawyers. 
With regard to the “low” strand of reasonableness, entity clients are gener-
ally not of limited means. Even mid and small size entity clients with little 
funds in their corporate treasuries do not easily fit into a traditional understand-
ing of “limited means,” which usually references levels of poverty and inability 
to pay for legal needs.67 Entity clients, in contrast, have different types of needs 
 
62  See, e.g., LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, 331 P.3d 1147, 1158 (Wash. 
2014); In re Pers. Restraint of Adams, 309 P.3d 451, 454 (Wash. 2013); Chism v. Tri-State 
Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting LK Operating, LLC v. Col-
lection Grp., LLC, 331 P.3d 1147, 1147); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE 
cmts. 14–15 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019) (“The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of rea-
son. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of 
the law itself . . . The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role.”). 
63  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE cmt. 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019) (“The 
profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public inter-
est . . . .”). 
64  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
65  Id. cmt. a (“This Section . . . does not forbid lawyers to serve for low fees or without 
charge; such service is often in the public interest.”). 
66  See id. cmt. b. 
67  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1, cmts. 2–3 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“[Rule 
6.1] recognize[s] the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited 
means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the 
disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee . . . . Persons eligible for legal 
services under [this Rule] are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the 
Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly 
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not only because generally their needs entail maximization of wealth, but also 
because in the absence of access to in-house lawyers their needs might be 
served by outside counsel.68 
Interpreting reasonableness in the “warranted” sense necessitates delving 
into the enigma of the stickiness and upward trajectory of legal fees. As the 
number of lawyers has grown exponentially since the 1960s, outpacing the (al-
so growing) demand for legal services, commentators have wondered why fees 
for legal services have generally not fallen, resulting in a significant unmet de-
mand for legal services by clients who cannot afford to pay the price, even at 
times of lawyers’ un- and under-employment.69 As Heinz and others have ex-
plained, the market for legal services consists of at least two hemispheres, a 
corporate and an individual one.70 In the corporate “greasing the wheels of the 
economy” hemisphere, clients can generally afford to pay relatively high fees 
and demand for legal services is robust. In the individual “justice” sphere, cli-
ents often cannot afford to pay for legal services, resulting in unmet demand. 
Prices for legal services in the individual hemisphere do not drop, however, be-
cause it has undersupply of attorneys as lawyers flock to the corporate hemi-
sphere.71 Indeed, lawyers continue to seek employment in the corporate hemi-
sphere even when jobs in it are scarce rather than switch to the individual 
hemisphere in part because the costs of legal education and of law practice 
have escalated leaving them with debts that cannot be serviced easily in the in-
dividual sphere, and in part because the individual hemisphere has relatively 
low professional esteem.72 
The stickiness of legal fees in the individual hemisphere and rising fees in 
the corporate hemisphere reveal the irony and counterintuitive legacy of Gold-
farb.73 When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down minimum fee schedules, it 
did so in the name of increasing competitiveness in the market for legal ser-
vices, expecting that striking down artificially high “minimum fees” would re-
 
above the guidelines utilized by such programs but nevertheless, cannot afford counsel. Le-
gal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, bat-
tered women’s centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means.”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
68  Admittedly, entity clients sometimes have indirect compelling needs, for example, the 
livelihood interests of their employees. See Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 749, 768 (2014) (advocating for the broadening of corporations’ responsibilities to 
include the interests of employees and other stakeholders). 
69  For a decade following the Great Recession over-supply of lawyers, some of whom were 
un- or under-employed, and the emergence of court-sponsored programs targeting some of 
these junior lawyers for apprenticeships led several commentators to speculate that supply of 
legal services to the underprivileged may increase. Unfortunately, these predictions have 
proven to be false. See Eli Wald, Serfdom Without Overlords: Lawyers and the Fight Against 
Class Inequality, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 269, 296 (2016). 
70  HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 58, at 319; HEINZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 29. 
71  See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Jus-
tice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 961–62 (2000). 
72  On the escalating cost of legal education and rising student debt, see, Eli Wald, The Con-
textual Problem of Law Schools, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 284 (2018). 
73  See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780, 793 (1975). 
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sult in market-driven lower fees for clients and increased access to legal ser-
vices.74 The reality has proven this thinking wrong. Market fees have stayed 
relatively high and often out of reach for many individual clients. From this 
perspective, the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) can be understood to 
impose a “maximum fee” meant to combat sticky “unwarranted” fees and in-
crease access to legal services, such that “[t]hose seeking to vindicate their 
rights through the private bar should not be deterred by the risk of unwarranted 
fee burdens.”75 
This “unwarranted” interpretation of the access to legal services rationale, 
understood in terms of capping fees at a reasonable level to overcome the stick-
iness of fees in the market for legal services to ensure that average clients are 
not priced out, applies to in-house lawyers with only limited force. To the ex-
tent that in-house pay is somewhat sticky, for example, because it is tied to the 
compensation of elite general counsel whose compensation in turn tracks those 
of C-Suite executives,76 unreasonably high salaries and compensation packages 
may result in pricing out mid-size and small businesses from the market for in-
house lawyers. Just like high legal fees in the corporate hemisphere lead to 
sticky legal fees in the individual hemisphere, high in-house compensation in 
the large entity client super-sphere may lead to high sticky in-house compensa-
tion throughout the in-house practice universe, resulting in “unwarranted” 
compensation undercutting the ability of some entity clients to assert their legal 
rights. Yet, entity clients that cannot afford in-house counsel may still retain 
outside counsel, and in-house pay may not prove sticky because even at levels 
lower than that of elite general counsel, it is still likely to attract lawyers given 
the high status of in-house positions. 
In sum, the increased access to legal services rationale does not apply well 
in the in-house context: entity clients in the corporate hemisphere generally 
have ample access to lawyers and legal services and are not of “limited means.” 
Moreover, compensation in the in-house universe is not likely to be sticky even 
if elite general counsel pay remains relatively high. 
c. Professionalism 
Third, the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) and Section 34 may 
be understood in terms of the social bargain the profession has struck with the 
public, pursuant to which, the public grants the profession a noncompetitive 
monopoly over the provision of legal service and in return the profession self-
regulates, guaranteeing the quality of legal services.77 Exactly because the pro-
 
74  Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 633, 643–44 (2013). 
75  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34, cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
76  General Counsel Bonus Structure, ASS’N CORP. COUNS. (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.acc 
.com/resource-library/general-counsel-bonus-structure [https://perma.cc/P+Y5S-X5KK]. 
77  See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 949, 951 (1963) (explaining that since it is quite difficult for lay customers, 
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fession has a monopoly, which results in noncompetitive fees, Rule 1.5(a) im-
poses on lawyers a reasonableness requirement to ensure that fees are not too 
high and out of touch with competitive market rates. 
That Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement is justified in terms of more 
than client protection and access to legal services is evident from the applicable 
case law. In the leading case of In the Matter of Fordham, attorney Fordham 
was disciplined for charging an unreasonable fee.78 Inter alia, Mr. Fordham ar-
gued that the fee in question could not be unreasonable because the clients, the 
Clarks, gave their informed consent to it.79 The court rejected the clients’ in-
formed consent as a safe harbor argument, holding that the Rule “creates ex-
plicitly an objective standard by which attorneys’ fees are to be judged,”80 and 
adding that “[t]he test as stated in the [Rule] is whether the fee ‘charged’ is 
clearly excessive, not whether the fee is accepted as valid or acquiesced in by 
the client.”81 If the sole rationale for the reasonableness requirement was the 
protection of vulnerable ill-informed clients from overreaching lawyers, then 
the informed consent of sophisticated clients would have been accepted by the 
court as a safe harbor because informed consent would have put to rest con-
cerns about client abuse. The court’s rejection of informed consent as a safe 
harbor and its insistence that Rule 1.5(a) imposes an objective standard irre-
spective of the client’s acquiescence means that the Rule’s rationale is broader 
than client protection and has in part to do with the status of lawyers as profes-
sionals as opposed to mere service providers. Indeed, the notion that the profes-
sion might restrict compensation in the name of professionalism is not new. For 
example, some commentators have argued that the professional status of law-
yers ought to prevent them from accepting stock options.82 
The social bargain and monopoly rationale applies to in-house counsel with 
as much force as it applies to all other lawyers. All lawyers, in-house attorneys 
 
even ex post, to evaluate the quality of professional services they receive because such ser-
vices are the product of esoteric knowledge they usually do not possess, the public and the 
profession strike a social bargain pursuant to which the public grants the profession a mo-
nopoly over the provision of services, and the profession, in return, promulgates and enforc-
es rules of conduct that are meant to ensure the quality of professional services). See also 
ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 59, 62 (1988); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE 
OF PROFESSIONALISM 208–09, 211 (1977); TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social 
Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 35, 38 (rev. ed. 1954). 
78  In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Mass. 1996). 
79  See id. at 820. 
80  Id. at 824. 
81  Id. 
82  Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent Judgment of the General 
Counsel – A Look at Stock Options, 81 N.D. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2005). But see ABA Comm. on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000) (approving lawyers’ acquisition of 
ownership in clients subject to compliance with the conflict of interest rules); John S. Dzien-
kowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Invest-
ments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 516–19 (2002) (exploring conflict concerns related to 
stock grants to in-house lawyers); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Coun-
sel: Issues Emerging from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 
497, 539 (1998) (same). 
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included, benefit from a monopoly over the provision of legal services, which 
restricts competition from nonlawyer legal service providers and results in non-
competitive fees and compensation.83 The social bargain confers on members 
of the legal profession this noncompetitive advantage because it views lawyers 
not as mere service providers but as professionals who owe clients correspond-
ing professional duties such as guaranteeing quality84 and keeping fees and 
compensation reasonable. 
In the context of in-house practice, one might be tempted to overlook the 
social bargain rationale on the ground that it contradicts the wishes of both enti-
ty clients and their in-house counsel: should not sophisticated entity clients be 
able to give their informed consent to noncompetitive in-house pay if they so 
desire? Yet such kneejerk reaction will be ill advised. Entity clients, as we have 
seen, are hardly a monolith. Some are not powerful or sophisticated vis-à-vis 
their in-house counsel. Moreover, the professionalism rationale is not depend-
ent on the wishes of some clients, the Clarks’ or entity clients’. Rather, the rea-
sonableness requirement is an obligation of all lawyers stemming from their 
professional status, monopoly over the provision of legal services, and the re-
sulting noncompetitive fees. The informed consent of particular clients in spe-
cific cases simply does not suffice to overcome the professional obligation of 
reasonable fees because the benefits lawyers derive from their professional sta-
tus are not conferred by these particular clients but rather by the public as part 
of the social bargain. 
Similarly, particular lawyers, in-house counsel included, cannot opt out of 
their professionalism obligations, the reasonableness of fees included, because 
the obligations are part of the social bargain entered into by the profession and 
the public. Furthermore, even if they could opt out of certain professional obli-
gations, in-house lawyers ought to exercise caution before doing so. Important-
ly, rejection of the social bargain and monopoly rationale for imposing a rea-
sonableness requirement on fees and in-house compensation, and, more 
generally, of professionalism-imposed duties on lawyers qua lawyers entails 
more than Rule 1.5(a). If in-house lawyers were to reject the duties imposed on 
them by virtue of their status as professionals, conceptually they risk opening 
the door to forfeiting corresponding professional prerogatives, such as being 
able to offer their clients confidentiality and restricting the provision of legal 
services by nonlawyers.85 This concern, to be sure, is anything but a theoretical 
possibility. In Europe, in-house lawyers have fewer professional prerogatives 
including significantly reduced confidentiality, exactly because they are not 
 
83  Cf. Arrow, supra note 77, at 949, 951. 
84  Id.; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 
1 (1975). 
85  See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) 
(arguing that confidentiality confers upon lawyers a noncompetitive advantage that is not in 
the best interest of clients and the public). 
260 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1  
considered to be independent professionals and are seen more as embedded 
employees of entity clients.86 
Put differently, in-house lawyers and the legal profession more generally 
cannot pick and choose among the nexus of professional obligations and bene-
fits their status as professionals imposes and confers on them. Rejection of pro-
fessional duties amounts to triggering the process of de-professionalizing and 
de-reregulating the practice of law, which the organized bar has long resisted.87 
In this context, the In the Matter of Fordham court’s rejection of informed cli-
ent consent as a safe harbor for unreasonable fees becomes, no pun intended, 
more reasonable from the profession’s point of view. 
d. Fiduciary Duties 
The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship, in which attor-
ney-agents owe clients-principals a fiduciary duty of loyalty.88 Thus, lawyers 
are not mere agents but rather special fiduciaries who owe clients heightened 
fiduciary duties.89 Arguably, the duty of loyalty encompasses the reasonable-
ness requirement such that charging clients unreasonable fees constitutes an act 
of disloyalty in violation of lawyers’ fiduciary obligations. 
The fiduciary rationale applies to in-house lawyers who owe entity-clients 
a fiduciary duty of loyalty.90 The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment states in relevant part that “[a] person who obtains a benefit (a) in 
breach of a fiduciary duty . . . is liable in restitution to the person to whom the 
 
86  Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. European Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-8360, I-
8393 (lawyers employed as in-house counsel are not sufficiently independent of their corpo-
rate entity employers and thus cannot not engage in privileged communications with their 
client, the corporation); J. Triplett Mackintosh & Kristen M. Angus, Conflict in Confidential-
ity: How E.U. Laws Leave In-House Counsel Outside the Privilege, 38 INT’L LAW. 35, 36 
(2004). 
87  See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 1–4 (2003). 
88  The Restatement defines the attorney-client relation in terms of an agency relationship, 
with its corresponding host of default fiduciary duties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (the “relationship of client and law-
yer arises when: (1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer pro-
vide legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to 
do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the ser-
vices . . . .”). 
89  Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 301–02 (1998); Eli 
Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 909, 924–25 (2009); W. Bradley Wendel. Should Lawyers Be Loyal to Clients, the Law, 
or Both?, 5–6 (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); W. Bradley Wendel, The Problem of 
the Faithless Principal: Fiduciary Theory and the Capacities of Clients, 124 PA. ST. L. REV. 
107, 144–45 (2019). 
90  This conclusion raises intriguing questions about the fiduciary duties of nonlawyer corpo-
rate agents to the entity and whether and how lawyers’ duty of loyalty differs than the duty 
of nonlawyers. See infra CONCLUSION. 
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duty is owed.”91 Comment e. explains that “[a] person occupying a fiduciary or 
confidential relation to another,” here an in-house lawyer, “is ordinarily re-
quired to observe ‘the utmost good faith’ in dealings within the scope of the re-
lation.”92 In particular, “[o]ver and above the duty of loyalty described in the 
preceding Comment, this obligation of heightened good faith bars the fiduciary 
from taking undue advantage of the beneficiary in direct dealings between them 
. . . ”,93 such as accepting an unreasonable salary and overall compensation. A 
2005 draft of the Restatement included the following illustration, explicitly ap-
plying a reasonableness requirement to in-house pay: 
Corporation’s President hires General Counsel to handle a pending regulatory 
investigation at an annual salary of $1 million. General Counsel works diligently 
for a period of 12 months, achieving a favorable result. In recognition of General 
Counsel’s services to Corporation, President awards him a bonus consisting of 
cash and other allowances having an aggregate value of $20 million. On suit 
brought by shareholders in the name of Corporation, the court finds that a bonus 
of $20 million (paid in addition to his regular salary) is “clearly excessive” for 
General Counsel’s services to Corporation and that General Counsel’s ac-
ceptance of the bonus constitutes a breach of General Counsel’s fiduciary duty 
to Corporation. Corporation has a claim by the rule of this Section to recover the 
amount by which $21 million exceeds a reasonable compensation for General 
Counsel’s services for the 12-month period.94 
As was the case with the social bargain and monopoly rationale, some in-
house counsel (and other lawyers) may resist fiduciary-based reasonableness 
restrictions on fees and compensation on the ground that they increasingly view 
themselves and are understood by their clients to be little more than service 
providers, as opposed to fiduciaries. Yet, the dismissal of fiduciary duties and 
the treatment of clients as arm’s length customers, as opposed to fiduciaries, 
entails the same risk of snubbing professional duties—the erosion of corre-
sponding prerogatives that have long been a staple of and defined the practice 
of law. 
In sum, the intent behind Rule 1.5(a) interpreted in the context of the Rules 
as a whole strongly suggests that the reasonableness requirement ought to apply 
to in-house compensation. Although the client protection rationale does not ap-
ply to all entity-clients equally because some large entity-clients tend to be sav-
vy and not in need of protection from in-house lawyers, other entity clients are 
very much in need of protection. As importantly, the overall bent of the Rules 
in favor of client protection and a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach miti-
gates toward imposing the reasonableness requirement on in-house lawyers. 
Next, while the increased access to legal services rationale generally poorly fits 
in-house practice realities, the professionalism rationale explained in terms of 
 
91  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. LAW INST., 
2011). 
92  Id. at cmt. e. 
93  Id. (emphasis added). 
94  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43, cmt. e., Illustra-
tion 26 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
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the social bargain, monopoly over the provision of legal services and the corre-
sponding monopolistic benefits of confidentiality and noncompetitive fees 
strongly applies to in-house lawyers. Finally, the fiduciary rationale imposes on 
in-house lawyers a duty of utmost good faith which prevents them from accept-
ing unreasonable pay. Consequently, in-house lawyers’ salaries and overall 
compensation are subject to a reasonableness requirement. 
3. Consistency Across the Rules: Rule 1.5(a) and Rule 1.8(a) 
The conclusion that the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) applies 
to in-house compensation is supported by analysis of Rule 1.8(a). Rule 1.8(a) 
states in relevant part that: 
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to 
a client unless: (1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the 
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and trans-
mitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client 
. . . .95 
Conceptually, an employment agreement is a business transaction between 
an in-house attorney and an entity client and certain components of overall 
compensation, such as stock grants and stock options, constitute the acquisition 
of an ownership and security interest in the client, triggering the fairness and 
reasonableness requirements of Rule 1.8(a). 
The Comment makes it clear that in-house pay is subject to a reasonable-
ness requirement, imposed either by Rule 1.5(a) or by Rule 1.8(a). It states in 
relevant part that: “It [the Rule] does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements 
between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its re-
quirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s 
business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”96 
Thus, if salary and overall in-house compensation are “ordinary fee arrange-
ments between client and lawyer,” as the above analysis argues,97 then Rule 
1.5(a) and its reasonableness requirement apply. If salary and overall compen-
sation are not “ordinary fee arrangements,” then they are part of a business 
transaction subject to the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a). Indeed, 
the Comment clearly applies to stock grants and options, stating that “its re-
quirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s 
business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”98 
Thus, the Comment identifies a clear conceptual fork in the road to a consistent 
and coherent construction of Rules 1.5(a) and 1.8(a): either in-house pay, in-
cluding salaries, is a “fee” subject to the reasonableness requirement of Rule 
 
95  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (emphasis added). 
96  Id. r. 1.8 cmt. 1. 
97  Supra Section I.A.1-2. 
98  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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1.5(a); or it is not, in which case it constitutes a business transaction and subject 
to the heightened reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a). 
 Unfortunately, the Chism courts unnecessarily confused this straightfor-
ward point. The trial court, having ruled that in-house bonuses were not a “fee” 
for purposes of Rule 1.5(a), inconsistently held that bonuses were a “fee” ar-
rangement for purposes of the comment to Rule 1.8(a).99 Perhaps mindful of 
the internal contradiction in its own analysis, the trial court then concluded that 
while salaries and bonuses were a “fee” for purposes of Rule 1.8(a), they were 
not an “ordinary fee arrangement” (because on the facts of the case they were a 
modification of an existing fee arrangement) and therefore held that 1.8(a) ap-
plied.100 With due respect, this analysis makes little sense. If in-house compen-
sation, including salaries and bonuses, is not a “fee,” then the distinction be-
tween “ordinary fee” and “nonordinary fee” is irrelevant. Instead, salaries and 
bonuses will be subject to the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a) not 
because they are nonordinary fees, but because they are not a fee and thus a 
business transaction subject to Rule 1.8(a). If, on the other hand, salaries and 
bonuses are a fee, then they are subject to Rule 1.5(a), not 1.8(a). 
Note that as the Comment to Rule 1.8 makes clear, in-house pay is clearly 
subject to a reasonableness requirement, either 1.5(a)’s “standard” reasonable-
ness requirement, which applies to all “fees,” or 1.8(a)’s “heightened” reasona-
bleness requirement (adding fairness, full disclosure and transmittal in writing 
to reasonableness), which applies to business transactions with clients.101 
Which reasonableness requirement better fits in-house practice? The court of 
appeals disapproved of applying the heightened reasonableness requirement of 
Rule 1.8(a) to in-house lawyers’ salaries and bonuses. It pointed out, correctly, 
that subjecting in-house pay to the heightened reasonableness requirement of 
Rule 1.8(a) would burden the lawyer-employee—client-employer relationship 
and “disturb the settled expectations of many lawyer-employees” by subjecting 
employment benefits to the scrutiny of Rule 1.8(a).102 The court of appeals 
added that such an interpretation would subject “standard wage contracts for 
lawyer-employees . . . to greater scrutiny overall than standard fee contracts, 
which are generally exempt from the rule [1.8(a)],”103 and only subject to the 
lesser-imposing reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a). Notably, the court 
of appeals could have achieved its policy outcome—exempting in-house pay 
from the heightened reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a)—by simply 
holding that in-house pay is a “fee” per Rule 1.5(a), in which case per the 
Comment to Rule 1.8(a) the latter Rule would be inapplicable. Indeed, logically 
 
99  Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). 
100  Id. 
101  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2019) (“[Rule 1.8(a)] 
does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed 
by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in 
the client’s business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”). 
102  Chism, 374 P.3d at 210. 
103  Id. 
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that was the only consistent interpretation open to the court of appeals: finding 
that salaries and bonuses were an “ordinary fee arrangement” per the Comment 
to Rule 1.8(a) meant that they were a “fee” and thus subject to Rule 1.5(a), a 
point lost on the court of appeals. 
Moreover, applying Rule 1.8(a) to in-house pay, as the trial court found, 
would create a confusing schism. Rule 1.8(a) only applies to a “lawyer” and a 
“client,” that is, it only applies if an attorney-client relationship exists. Thus, if 
in-house pay was deemed a business transaction triggering Rule 1.8(a), the 
Rule would apply to situations when an outside counsel is negotiating with her 
client to become its in-house counsel (because an attorney-client relationship 
already exists between the parties), but would not apply when a client would be 
negotiating an in-house position with a lawyer who does not represent it.104 In 
sum, as the Comment to Rule 1.8 states, “ordinary fee arrangements between 
client and lawyer,”105 that is, ordinary compensation matters in the attorney-
client relationship, inclusive of in-house compensation, ought to be governed 
by Rule 1.5(a), not Rule 1.8(a). 
4. Applying a Reasonableness Requirement to In-House Pay 
A plain language, as well as an intent-based interpretation of Rule 1.5(a), 
suggests that “fee” ought to be construed to include in-house pay. Such an im-
portant and timely issue, however, should not wait until it makes its way to 
state supreme courts or risk conflicting interpretations by different courts. In-
stead, the ABA should address the issue by revising the first sentence of Rule 
1.5(a) and comment 1 respectively to read: 
1.5(a) “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an un-
reasonable fee or compensation or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The 
reasonableness requirement applies to the compensation of in-house law-
yers.”106 
[1] “Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees and forms of compen-
sation that are reasonable under the circumstances.” 
In the alternative, the ABA can leave Rule 1.5(a) and comment 1 intact and 
add to its terminology section, Rule 1.0, a new definition as follows: 
1.0(x) “Fee” denotes the payment for legal services provided by a lawyer 
to a client, including payment by an organizational client to its in-house coun-
sel in the form of salaries, bonuses, or nonmonetary benefits. 
Notably, even if the ABA were to amend the Rules to clarify that “fee” in-
cludes in-house salaries and bonuses, three doctrinal issues warrant attention. 
 
104  Id. at 211 n.28. 
105  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
106  Appendix A collects all the proposed amendments to the Rules discussed in this Article. 
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a. Stock Grants and Stock Options 
Consider stock grants and stock options, a common component of in-house 
counsel’s compensation.107 Recall that Comment 1 to Rule 1.8 states in relevant 
part that “[the Rule] does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client 
and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be 
met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s business or other non-
monetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”108 Accordingly, while 
most aspects of in-house compensation, namely salaries, bonuses and nonmon-
etary benefits would be governed by Rule 1.5(a), stock grants and stock options 
would be governed by the stricter Rule 1.8(a). Notably, this is exactly the cur-
rent state of affairs for all lawyers, whose fees are generally subject to Rule 
1.5(a), except that stock grants and stock options are subject to Rule 1.8(a), ex-
plained by a concern regarding a conflict of interest inherent in fees that grant 
lawyers an interest in the client’s business.109 
In addition to Rule 1.8(a), stock grants and stock options are also regulated, 
indirectly, by Rule 5.6(a). Rule 5.6(a) states in relevant part that: “A lawyer 
shall not participate in offering or making: . . . a partnership, shareholders, op-
erating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right 
of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship.”110 The Rule has 
routinely been interpreted to forbid in-house lawyers from becoming parties to 
noncompete agreements.111 In the context of in-house practice, however, Rule 
5.6 imposes a harsh constraint because stock grants and stock options are a 
common feature of in-house compensation packages and the grant of stocks 
and stock options is often subject to the execution of a noncompete agree-
ment.112 
Currently, some in-house lawyers and their entity clients may awkwardly 
ignore the constraints of Rule 5.6(a), yet even if some in-house lawyers are 
willing to engage in misconduct by ignoring the rule and risk disciplinary ac-
tion, violating Rule 5.6(a) creates uncertainty as to the enforceability of non-
compete clauses for in-house counsel. A stock grant or option agreement be-
tween an in-house attorney and an entity-client is prima facie valid, 
 
107  Barclift, supra note 82, at 16; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 82, at 517; Liggio, su-
pra note 38, at 1026 n.16; Moore, supra note 82, at 538. 
108  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (emphasis add-
ed). 
109  Id. 
110  Id. r. 5.6(a). 
111  See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-381 (1994); 
N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2006); Tonio D. DeSorrento, En-
forceability of Restrictive Covenants: Are In-House Counsel to be Exempt from Non-
Competes?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 487, 492–93 (2007). 
112  M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of Unpredictabil-
ity, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 151 (2003) (“It is increasingly common to see noncom-
pete provisions tied to stock options or stock grants.”); Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants 
Not to Compete: Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 
1273–76 (2018). 
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notwithstanding an offending noncompete clause in violation of Rule 5.6(a).113 
If a dispute arises between in-house counsel and the client over a violation of 
the noncompete, for example, when the client seeks to enforce the noncompete 
and enjoin its former in-house lawyer from taking an in-house position with a 
business competitor, the former in-house counsel will ask a court to set aside 
the offending noncompete clause as violative of Rule 5.6(a) and thus of public 
policy. In other words, a noncompete clause in a stock grant agreement that vi-
olates Rule 5.6(a) does not automatically void the entire agreement. Rather, a 
court will have to entertain a motion to strike the clause as against public poli-
cy. This posture entails inherent uncertainty, as a court considering such a mo-
tion, may refuse to set the clause aside and enforce the noncompete, for exam-
ple, if the in-house counsel who executed it was aware of Rule 5.6(a), or if she 
exercised stock options or cashed out stock grants pursuant to the agreement. In 
the alternative, the court may strike the noncompete clause, either letting the 
rest of the agreement stand, or invalidating the entire agreement. 
In addition to the inherent uncertainty regarding enforceability of noncom-
pete clauses entered into by in-house counsel, which the lawyers can avoid by 
simply complying with the noncompete, this state of affairs forces in-house 
counsel to make an uncomfortable choice: forgo a common form of compensa-
tion or violate Rule 5.6(a) even when no disputes arise with the entity-client. 
Worse, the knowing violation of Rule 5.6(a) may trigger other violations of the 
Rules, such as failure to report one’s own misconduct on the part of the in-
house attorney pursuant to Rule 8.3(a),114 and failure to put in place reasonable 
 
113  Misconduct is a matter of discipline, not civil liability, and, in particular, a violation of 
the Rules does not in-and-of-itself invalidate any civil agreement or lead to civil liability. 
The Scope section of the Rules explains that: “The Rules are designed to provide guidance to 
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They 
are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can 
be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact 
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the 
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral 
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE, cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (emphasis added). The comment 
adds that: “Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a 
lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of con-
duct.” Id. Thus, although a violation of the Rules does not automatically invalidate a con-
tract, misconduct may serve as a ground for setting a contract or a clause aside as violative of 
public policy. 
114  Rule 8.3(a) states that: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate 
professional authority.” Id. r. 8.3(a). While the rule itself mandates reporting of “another 
lawyer[’s]” misconduct, it has often been interpreted to also require self-reporting. See, e.g., 
Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-1 (2007) (“A lawyer is re-
quired to self-report his or her professional misconduct, as well as report others’ misconduct 
. . . .”); Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation and the Duty to Report Miscon-
duct, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 40, 44 n.5 (2011). To the extent that 
Rule 8.3(a) requires self-reporting, surly a knowing violation of the rule for personal gain—
securing stock grants—would entail “fitness as a lawyer.” 
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procedures to ensure compliance with the Rules on the part of the general 
counsel as head of the in-house legal department pursuant to Rule 5.1(a).115 
The comment to Rule 5.6(a) explains that it is grounded in respect for the 
client’s freedom to choose a lawyer.116 Consider the following typical example. 
Lawyer, a partner at Law Firm A, represents Client. Lawyer wishes to move to 
Law Firm B. If Lawyer were subject to a noncompete agreement with Law 
Firm A prohibiting Lawyer from representing current clients of Law Firm A 
upon leaving the firm, Client will not be able to move with Lawyer to Law 
Firm B and will be deprived her choice of lawyer, namely, Lawyer. 
Note, however, that this typical concern does not apply to in-house coun-
sel. When an in-house counsel leaves her position with an entity client, because 
the entity was the in-house counsel’s only client, no current client exists that 
may wish to move with the in-house counsel to another entity and will be de-
prived her choice of counsel. Indeed, the only party that may be denied its 
choice of counsel is not a current client of the in-house counsel but the potential 
new entity employer, typically not a client who lacks access to lawyers and le-
gal services. 
That the main rationale for Rule 5.6(a)—protecting current clients’ choice 
of counsel—does not apply to in-house lawyers is hardly a surprise: the Rule 
was promulgated before the rise of in-house counsel and before stock grants 
and stock options became a common feature of executive compensation, in-
house lawyers included. Moreover, although several ethics opinions have con-
strued Rule 5.6(a) to apply to in-house lawyers,117 arguably that interpretation 
was erroneous, ignoring the in-house context in favor of applying the rule to all 
lawyers consistent with the one-size-fits-all regulatory approach of the ABA. 
Moreover, as the typical example of lawyer mobility illustrates, Rule 5.6(a) 
was designed to prohibit noncompete agreements between lawyers and their 
law firms, which may restrict clients’ choice of counsel.118 However, in the in-
house context the noncompete agreement is not between lawyers and their law 
firms but rather between entity-clients and their in-house lawyers. To the extent 
that such agreements between clients and lawyers restrict the right of lawyers to 
practice they are conceptually similar to limitations imposed by the conflict 
rules on lawyers’ practice and should not be the subject of Rule 5.6(a).119 Ra-
 
115  Rule 5.1(a) states that: “A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or togeth-
er with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance 
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). For purposes of Rule 5.1(a), an in-house 
legal department is a law firm. See id. r. 1.0(c). 
116  Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 1 (“An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a 
firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to 
choose a lawyer.”). 
117  DeSorrento, supra note 111 at 492–93 (internal citations omitted). 
118  Supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
119  Rules 1.7 and 1.9, for example, conceptually restrict a lawyer’s right to practice due to 
duties owed respectively to current and former clients, and such “restrictions” are in part a 
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ther than applying Rule 5.6(a) mechanically and harshly to in-house lawyers in 
circumstances that fail to adhere to the Rule’s rationale, Rule 5.6(a) should be 
amended as follows to clarify that it does not apply to agreements between cli-
ents and their in-house counsel: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: 
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar 
type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termina-
tion of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retire-
ment or an agreement concerning the grant of stock grants or stock options to 
in-house counsel as part of a compensation agreement subject to a reasonable 
noncompete provision;  
b. Fee Modifications 
The established interpretation of Rule 1.5(a) holds that its reasonableness 
requirement applies to both the initial fee arrangement between attorney and 
client and to any fee agreement modifications after the attorney-client relation-
ship is formed.120 Moreover, changes in fee arrangements that involve a lawyer 
acquiring an interest in the client’s business require compliance with Rule 
1.8(a).121 Accordingly, if in-house salaries, bonuses and nonmonetary compen-
sation such as health benefits were to be deemed fees, then any modification to 
these terms would be subject to Rule 1.5(a), and any modifications to in-house 
lawyers’ stock grants and options would be subject to Rule 1.8(a). To be sure, 
“fee modification” may be agreed upon in the original “fee” arrangement. For 
example, a lawyer may advise a client in an initial fee arrangement that the 
lawyer may reasonably increase her fees annually without subjecting herself to 
Rule 1.8(a).122 Thus, a client-employer may reference adjustments or anticipate 
raises to a lawyer-employee’s salaries, bonuses, and nonmonetary compensa-
tion in the initial employer-employee agreement. 
 
function of agreements between clients and attorneys, manifested in clients’ informed con-
sent. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4), 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
120  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-458 (2011). 
121  Id.; Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (internal 
citations omitted). 
122  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 120; MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“When the lawyer has regularly rep-
resented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or 
rate of the fee . . . for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relation-
ship, however, an understanding as to fees . . . must be promptly established.”); see also 
Douglas R. Richmond, Changing Fee Arrangements During Representations: What are the 
Rules?, 15 PROF. LAW. 2, 2, 17 (2004). 
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c. A Personal Conflict of Interest Negotiating One’s Own Fees, Rule 
1.7(a)(2) 
In Chism, Tri-State argued (and the trial court agreed) that bonus negotia-
tions between Mr. Chism and the entity-client violated Rule 1.7.123 Rule 
1.7(a)(2) prohibits lawyers from “represent[ing] a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest ex-
ists if . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients 
will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.”124 Specifi-
cally, Tri-State argued that an in-house lawyer’s negotiations with a client re-
garding a bonus involve the lawyer’s personal interest in the bonus and thus 
constitute a conflict.125 
Outside of the in-house context, the Rules elegantly sidestep the argument 
that Rule 1.7(a)(2) applies to fee negotiations between attorney and client. At 
the outset of the attorney-client relationship when the fee arrangement is nego-
tiated for the first time, the lawyer does not represent the client and thus Rule 
1.7 does not apply. Notably, however, Rule 1.5(a) applies at this stage guaran-
teeing that the fee is reasonable, as well as to fee modifications.126  
In one instance, however, Rule 1.7(a)(2) arguably applies to fee negotia-
tions, when a lawyer negotiates with a current client a fee for a new matter, be-
cause one could assert that the lawyer’s representation of the client in the pend-
ing matter could be materially limited by the lawyer’s personal interest in 
negotiating the fee in the new matter. Such an argument ought to be rejected for 
at least two reasons. First, in an ongoing attorney-client relationship, the attor-
ney does not represent the client in the fee negotiations. Second, burdening the 
fee negotiations with an informed consent requirement, the practical impact of 
applying Rule 1.7(a)(2) to the situation would be impractical and unnecessary 
given that Rule 1.5(a), which applies to the new matter, already guarantees that 
the fee in the new matter will be reasonable. 
The same rationale should apply to negotiations between in-house lawyers 
and their clients. At the outset of the relationship the in-house lawyer does not 
represent the client and thus Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not apply to the compensation 
negotiations, but Rule 1.5(a) does. Subsequently, fee modifications, including 
bonus negotiations, will be subject to Rule 1.5(a) and not Rule 1.7(a)(2) be-
cause the in-house lawyer does not represent the entity-client in the fee modifi-
cation negotiations and because Rule 1.5(a) guarantees the reasonableness of 
the modified in-house compensation. 
To recap the analysis to this point, the best interpretation of the Rules, 
which the ABA may confirm in clarifying amendments,127 is as follows: the 
reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) generally applies to in-house pay 
 
123  Chism, 374 P.3d at 207. 
124  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
125  Chism, 374 P.3d at 208. 
126  Supra Section I.A.4.b. 
127  See infra Appendix A. 
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with the exception of stock grants and stock options, which are subject to the 
heightened requirements of Rule 1.8(a). Rule 5.6(a) should not preclude the 
grant of stock and stock options to in-house lawyers subject to a reasonable 
noncompete provision. Modifications to in-house pay, just like modifications to 
all fees, are generally subject to Rule 1.5(a), except in circumstances that in-
volve modifications to stock grants and options, which are subject to Rule 
1.8(a). Finally, Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not impose an additional constraint on in-
house pay, above and beyond the reasonableness standard of Rule 1.5(a). 
B. What’s Reasonable? Assessing the Reasonableness of In-House Pay 
Rule 1.5(a) states in relevant part that; 
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include 
the following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing 
the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.128 
The Comment adds that “[t]he factors specified in (1) through (8) are not 
exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance.”129 
To begin with, per the second factor, in-house compensation may take into 
account that employment as in-house counsel precludes other employment by 
the lawyer, rendering a salary, as opposed to an hourly rate or a flat fee, a rea-
sonable arrangement. Importantly, taking a position as an in-house counsel not 
only foregoes the representation of clients other than the entity-employer, but 
may also result in reduced opportunities for training and mentoring compared 
to traditional law firms, as well as a more limited diet of well-rounded work as-
signments.130 
Applying the other Rule 1.5(a) factors demands careful contextual atten-
tion. The world of in-house counsel is incredibly diverse with the practice vary-
ing greatly depending on client needs and job responsibilities,131 such that the 
application of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh factors will vary depend-
ing on the circumstances. 
 
128  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
129  Id. r. 1.5 cmt. 1. 
130  Eli Wald, Getting in and out of the House: Career Trajectories of In-House Lawyers, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author). 
131  Id. 
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Per the first factor, the reasonableness of in-house pay will depend on the 
time and labor required. Some clients, such as Tri-State, only need a part-time 
in-house attorney working on average 1.5 hours a day,132 whereas others will 
expect a more traditional 9 to 5 workday and still others may expect service 
around the clock based on the twenty-four-seven hypercompetitive model of 
Big Law.133 Next, some in-house lawyers may be subject-matter experts with 
corresponding limited time and labor requirements, for example, an associate 
general counsel for intellectual property affairs. Others may be the general 
counsel charged with overseeing all the legal affairs of the client-entity, and 
even within the general counsel universe, time and labor expectations may vary 
greatly depending on clients’ needs. Indeed, some general counsel, for exam-
ple, elite general counsel serving large entity clients, may assume broader re-
sponsibilities as legal advisors, counsel, business leaders, compliance officers, 
human resource officers etc., significantly increasing their time and labor.134 
Moreover, the entire notion of in-house counsel’s “time and labor re-
quired” differs from that of outside counsel. Traditionally, outside counsel’s 
“time” has been quantified and measured for purposes of fee calculations in 
terms of billable hours.135 Yet, not only do in-house lawyers traditionally not 
record billable hours, but that concept overlooks an important aspect of in-
house lawyers’ time investment in “soft” hours, getting to know the industry, 
the particulars of the entity-client, the various constituents of the client, and the 
non-legal bases of knowledge relevant for doing the job right.136 In particular, 
travel may be a significant aspect of some in-house lawyers’ work-related 
commitments, yet play a minor role in the professional lives of others.137 In or-
der to do the job effectively and become persuasive, let alone influential within 
their entity-clients, in-house counsel often invest ample soft hours that ought to 
be acknowledged and reflected in their pay.138 
 
132  Chism, 374 P.3d at 196. 
133  Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, 
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2263 
(2010) [hereinafter Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends]. 
134  PRASHANT DUBEY & EVA KRIPALANI, THE GENERALIST COUNSEL: HOW LEADING 
GENERAL COUNSEL ARE SHAPING TOMORROW’S COMPANIES 136 (2013); BEN W. HEINEMAN, 
JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION 32 
(2016); E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE 
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 39 (2012). 
135  WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY 
ATTORNEYS 21 (1996); Douglas R. Richmond, In Defense of the Billable Hour, 14 PROF. 
LAW. 1, 4 (2003); Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable Hours, and 
Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 210 (2000). 
136  Eli Wald, In-House Myths, WIS. L. REV. 407, 427–32 (2012) [hereinafter Wald, In-House 
Myths] (exploring the notion of “soft” in-house hours). 
137  Id. at 434–35. 
138  Compare ROSS, supra note 135, at 231, and Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours 
Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 
179 (2005), with Wald, In-House Myths, supra note 136, at 428–29 (exploring the notion of 
“soft” in-house hours). 
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The first factor also references “the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved,”139 which may vary greatly among in-house lawyers: some deal pri-
marily with routine, relatively simple, matters; whereas others address complex 
and difficult challenges.140 Similarly, the last clause of the first factor, “the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly,”141 may vary greatly among in-
house lawyers. For some subject-matter experts, it would mean narrowly con-
strued legal skills, for others the job would require having the skills of a gener-
alist, and yet for others the necessary skills would entail non-legal expertise and 
knowledge. 
The fourth factor, “the amount involved and the results obtained,” will also 
vary depending on context.142 Smaller entity clients will tend to have routine 
matters with relatively modest amounts at stake whereas large entity clients 
will have larger amounts in play.143 The amount involved and the results ob-
tained will also depend on the nature of the services performed in-house: some 
entities will rely on their in-house legal departments to handle all of their af-
fairs, including their “make or break” litigation and transactional work; where-
as other entity clients will prefer to use outside counsel for these type of mat-
ters.144 The same contextual approach will guide the assessment of the fifth 
factor, “the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.”145 
Depending on in-house counsels’ job descriptions and responsibilities, some 
will regularly face tight turnaround times and strict deadlines whereas others 
will enjoy a more relaxed work environment, affecting the reasonableness of 
the compensation.  
“[T]he nature . . . of the professional relationship with the client,”146 an as-
pect of the sixth factor, may include considerations such as whether one is an 
in-house lawyer or the general counsel, as well as whether one served previous-
ly as an outside counsel to the entity client. The “length of the professional re-
lationship” indicates that seniority and experience with the client are relevant to 
assessing the reasonableness of the compensation,147 as are “the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services” per the 
seventh factor.148 
Notably, the eighth and third factors require close scrutiny when applied to 
in-house practice. As we have seen above, stock options have emerged as a 
common component of some in-house lawyers’ compensation, triggering Rule 
 
139  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
140  See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 35, at 277; Rosen, supra note 36, at 483. 
141  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
142  Id. r. 1.5(a)(4). 
143   Liggio, supra note 38, at 1207. 
144  Id. 
145  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(5) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
146  Id. r. 1.5(a)(6). 
147  Id. 
148  Id. r. 1.5(a)(7). 
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1.5(a)’s eighth factor, “whether the fee is fixed or contingent,”149 and once 
again, the unique context of in-house practice warrants careful consideration of 
the Rule. Traditionally, contingency fees, ranging from 15 to 35 percent, have 
been deemed reasonable even when they were found to be higher compared to 
an hourly fee exactly because of the risk of nonpayment inherent in a contin-
gency fee arrangement.150 
To some extent, the rationale behind the eighth factor carries over to the 
world of in-house counsel. Stock grants and stock options as part of an in-house 
lawyer’s compensation introduce risk because stock may not appreciate (or 
even depreciate) and options at the time they mature may be worth nothing, 
such that the contingency and higher risk involved may explain and deem rea-
sonable higher contingent compensation as compared with fixed compensa-
tion.151 
Indeed, one aspect of stock as a component of compensation suggests even 
greater flexibility in assessing the reasonableness of contingent in-house com-
pensation as compared to traditional contingency fees. While some aspects of 
traditional contingency fees are outside of a lawyer’s control, such as the facts 
of the case, the governing law, and the jurors’ or judge’s sentiments; a typical 
lawyer undertaking a matter on a contingency fee has ample control over 
whether to take the case, and, if taken, on the outcome of the case by virtue of 
the quality of the representation she provides to the client. In contrast, the typi-
cal in-house lawyer will have little impact on the contingency involved with the 
value of the stock or stock options, which will be determined by market per-
formance and considerations. Because in-house counsel, compared to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, have relatively little control over the contingent nature of their com-
pensation, they assume greater risk when accepting stock as a component of 
compensation, which may support higher compensation as reasonable. 
At the same time, important differences ought to inform the assessment of 
contingency pay as a component of reasonableness. In general, the Rules per-
mit contingency fee arrangements in Rule 1.5(c) notwithstanding the conflict of 
interest they introduce vis-à-vis the client to increase access to legal services 
for those who cannot afford to pay and the corresponding concern that, absent 
 
149  Id. r. 1.5(a)(8). 
150  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567 (4th ed. 1992) (The economic 
rationale for fee enhancement in contingency cases has been explained as follows: “A con-
tingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. 
The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for 
the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is high because the risk of 
default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much high-
er than that of conventional loans”); Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingen-
cies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 43 (1989). The risk 
rationale has been adopted by courts. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 742 (Cal. 
2001) (“A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not 
receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these func-
tions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.”) 
(citations omitted). 
151  See Barclift, supra note 82, at 7–10. 
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contingency arrangements, some meritorious claims will not be brought by un-
derprivileged clients who cannot afford to pay lawyers to do so.152 Notably, no 
analogous rationale supports approving contingency compensation for most in-
house lawyers. Whatever the rationale may be, from prevailing practice reali-
ties in the corporate executive compensation sphere, to aligning the interests of 
in-house lawyers and their clients, to accommodating corporate entities’ prefer-
ences for flexibility and efficiencies in structuring compensation, most corpo-
rate entities do not offer stock grants or stock options to their in-house lawyers 
because they otherwise cannot afford them.153 Because stock grants and options 
do not serve the goal of increasing access to legal services for those who cannot 
afford to pay for them and instead simply reflect risk allocation between in-
house counsel and their entity clients, the contingency risk shouldered by in-
house counsel is of different and smaller nature than the one shouldered by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and is hence subjected to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) as 
a business transaction.154 
Finally, “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal ser-
vices,”155 the third factor, traditionally takes into account relevant cost of liv-
ing, the cost of doing business, and other relevant practice considerations, for 
example, accounting for the fact that lawyers in large metropolitan centers 
charge higher fees than their counterparts in mid-markets or smaller towns; or 
that urban lawyers charge higher fees than their rural colleagues within the 
same jurisdiction.156 The same insight naturally applies to in-house lawyers 
who may practice in in-house legal departments across different localities, 
which vary in size, structure, tasks and roles. 
The nature of in-house practice, however, may require a more flexible and 
expansive interpretation of the third factor to encompass not only what other in-
house lawyers make, but also what outside counsel charge, and, just as im-
portantly, what other corporate executives/employees in the entity make. In-
house legal departments tend to hire experienced lawyers, often partners and 
associates from within the ranks of their outside counsel.157 Thus, a relevant 
factor in assessing the reasonableness of in-house compensation needs to be the 
fees and compensation of these outside counsel lawyers, which entity clients 
 
152  Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 307 (1998); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A 
Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 625, 627–28 
(1995); see also Richard M. Birnholz, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Con-
trols, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 953 (1990). 
153  See Barclift, supra note 82, at 7–10; Liggio, supra note 38, at 1206. 
154  Supra Section I.A.4.a. 
155  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
156  See, e.g., Kalloo v. Unlimited Mech. Co. of NY, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that the “court should . . . ‘attempt to approximate the market rates 
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, 
experience, and reputation’ ”) (quoting Green v. City of N.Y., 403 Fed. Appx. 626, 629 (2d 
Cir. 2010)). 
157  Wald, In-House Myths, supra note 136, at 445–46. 
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will pay attention to in terms of being able to recruit and retain their in-house 
lawyers. At the same time, in order to be able to do their jobs effectively, in-
cluding being taken seriously, respected, and deferred to by their nonlawyer 
colleagues outside their in-house legal departments, in-house lawyers’ compen-
sation will need to be on par with, and reflect, the compensation of nonlawyer 
counterparts. 
Notably, while taking account of nonlawyers’ compensation in assessing 
the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ pay is necessary and sensible, it is a 
significant expansion of the Rule. Generally speaking, executive compensation 
in corporate America is not subject to an objective reasonableness standard. Ra-
ther, determinations of executive compensation are considered part of the duty 
of care in the corporate governance apparatus, which means that they are sub-
ject to the Business Judgement Rule.158 Briefly, this means that as long as ex-
ecutive compensation decisions are well-informed and free of conflicts of inter-
est, courts do not substantively second-guess them and do not review them for 
reasonableness, instead deferring to the business judgment of the authorized 
corporate constituents who made them.159 Some commentators have harshly 
criticized the application of the Business Judgment Rule doctrine to executive 
compensation, arguing that it results in waste, or unusually high and unreason-
able compensation packages that escape judicial scrutiny.160 
A classic example of excessive compensation concerns is the litigation sur-
rounding the executive compensation packages at Disney.161 To entice Mr. 
Ovitz away from his lucrative Hollywood job and take the reins at Disney, the 
Disney Board offered him a lucrative compensation package.162 When Mr. 
Ovitz left Disney a mere thirteen months later, his severance package entitled 
him to approximately $130 Million and Disney shareholders sued, arguing es-
sentially that the compensation package was unreasonable and constituted a 
waste of corporate funds.163 In a highly watched, unanimous decision, the Del-
aware Supreme Court rejected the claim, affirmed the Business Judgment Rule, 
 
158  See Kenneth R. Davis, Cash of the Titans: Arbitrating Challenges to Executive Compen-
sation, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 252–53 (2014); Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Execu-
tive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fidu-
ciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 865, 877–78 (2011). 
159  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
160  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 
29 (2006); see also Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in 
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (2005); Peter C. Kostant, Meaningful 
Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
421, 425–26 (2011); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 486 
(2004). 
161  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006). 
162  Id. at 35–37. 
163  Id. at 35. In hiring Mr. Ovitz, the board approved an employment agreement that includ-
ed a generous non-fault termination provision. When Ovitz failed to perform up to expecta-
tions in his new position, the board terminated his employment without cause. Id. at 41, 45–
46. 
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and de facto refused to substantively second guess the compensation package 
for reasonableness. In particular, the Court refused to scrutinize the compensa-
tion package afforded to Mr. Ovitz on the merits because the executive com-
pensation decision-making process followed by the Disney Board was in-
formed.164 
The practical import of taking into account comparable corporate executive 
compensation in assessing the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ compensa-
tion is that arguably unreasonable corporate executive compensation, or, at 
least, corporate executive compensation not subject to a reasonableness con-
straint, will inform and shape the notion of in-house lawyers’ reasonable pay. 
In other words, taking account of corporate executive compensation in as-
sessing the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ pay allows the unreasonable 
(or at least the possibly unreasonable) to shape and inform what’s reasonable. 
This challenge, compelling as it may be, reveals complex insights about in-
house lawyers, their identities, practice realities, professional status within the 
profession and their entity-clients, and the corresponding difficulties of regulat-
ing them effectively within the Rules’ gamut. On the one hand, ignoring corpo-
rate executive compensation in assessing the reasonableness of in-house law-
yers’ pay means ignoring a materially relevant aspect of what it is that in-house 
lawyers do and how to assess the value they generate and the compensation 
they deserve. On the other hand, acknowledging the relevance of corporate ex-
ecutive compensation in assessing the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ pay 
may pull the rug from underneath the entire professional commitment to a rea-
sonableness requirement on lawyers’ fees by injecting into the professional cal-
culus, if only as one relevant factor, the arguably unreasonable and excessive 
tint of corporate executive compensation. 
 Moreover, opening the door to insights from corporate executive compen-
sation meant to inform and guide the reasonableness analysis of in-house law-
yers’ compensation may counterintuitively introduce more uncertainty than 
predictability. For example, one commentator notes, “[a]s part of the recruiting 
process, some corporate executives are offered . . . employment agreements 
that provide them with severance in the event of their termination without 
cause. . . . Is there any industry standard for the term of severance payments . . . 
 
164  Id. at 52, 67–68. While the Court did acknowledge at least three categories of failure to 
act in good faith, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of ad-
vancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to vio-
late applicable positive law, and where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a 
known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties, id. at 67, and noted 
that a plaintiff could rebut the Business Judgment Rule by showing that the board of direc-
tors acted in bad faith, id. at 52, it found that the Disney board did not violate its duty of 
good faith when it approved Mr. Ovitz’s employment agreement, terminated Ovitz without 
cause, and approved the payment of his severance package. Id. at 52, 67–68. For a compre-
hensive overview of the case and of the duty of good faith, see Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., 
The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 582 (2008); Jona-
than Macey, The Nature of Conflicts of Interest Within the Firm, 31 J. CORP. L. 613, 631 
(2006). 
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? . . . [T]here is no industry standard.”165 If no industry standard exists in the 
corporate world for severance in the event of termination without cause, insert-
ing this (non)standard to the assessment of in-house lawyers’ severance pack-
ages may cloud rather than clarify the analysis. 
Nonetheless, in the context of in-house pay, “the fee customarily charged 
in the locality for similar legal services,”166 ought to be interpreted to include 
the fee and salary customarily charged and commanded by comparable outside 
counsel and corporate executives who provide similar legal and nonlegal ser-
vices. 
Construing the reasonableness factors of Rule 1.5(a) sensibly, recognizing 
that the analysis ought to take into account the evolving practice realities of in-
house lawyers to avoid imposing an impractical standard blind to the work, 
roles, and challenges faced by in-house counsel, is not tantamount to reducing 
the reasonableness requirement to no standard at all. To be sure, the point of the 
inquiry is not a sham meant to legitimize and justify any and all in-house pay, 
that is, to impose a reasonableness requirement on in-house lawyers only to 
then expand the definition of reasonableness to essentially allow any compen-
sation package to withstand scrutiny. As we have seen, the same policy ration-
ales that explain and account for the reasonableness constraint on the fees of 
outside counsel apply to in-house pay. Interpreting the meaning of reasonable-
ness sensibly, with an eye toward the realities of in-house practice, does not 
erode the importance of subjecting in-house pay to an objective reasonableness 
standard, in stark contrast to the no-substantive-scrutiny approach generally 
taken by courts with regard to executive compensation. 
The two-part in-house pay inquiry undertaken in Part I of this Article—
exploring the applicability of the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) to 
in-house salaries, bonuses and nonmonetary benefits, and examining the mean-
ing of reasonableness—reveals profound insights regarding the transformation 
of law practice in the twenty-first century, the decline of the lawyer-
professional and the rise of the lawyer-employee, as well as the lawyer-
businessperson. These developments must be considered before the ABA rush-
es to address the regulatory ambiguity surrounding in-house pay. 
II. IN-HOUSE PAY AS THE OPENING SHOT IN THE CLASS WAR BETWEEN 
LAWYER-PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYER-EMPLOYEES 
The conclusion that Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement applies to in-
house pay does not stand for the assertion, and should not be construed to 
mean, that all the rules of professional conduct apply to all lawyer-employees. 
Part I.A.’s conclusion cannot be generalized because it depends not only on the 
plain language of Rule 1.5(a) and its intent and rationales, but also, as we have 
seen, on the status of in-house lawyers as powerful lawyer-employees, their 
 
165  John Okray & Diana Lai, Hiring and Compensation Trends for In-House Counsel, FED. 
LAW. 34, 35–36 (2014) (emphasis added). 
166  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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role as professionals and fiduciaries, the identity of their clients, and the nature 
of the legal services they provide. This seemingly obvious caveat—statutory 
interpretation depends on language, intent, rationales and context—and its os-
tensibly obvious application—one should not assume automatically that all the 
rules of professional conduct apply to all lawyer-employees—nonetheless un-
dermines two longstanding cornerstones of the legal profession. Acknowledg-
ing that different lawyers, such as lawyer-employees as opposed to lawyer-
professionals, have different status, perform different tasks and roles, and offer 
different types of legal services to clients, undercuts the One Profession myth 
that the organized bar has long labored to cultivate and sustain.167 It also ques-
tions the wisdom of the ABA’s one-size-fits-all regulatory approach, pursuant 
to which one set of rules of professional conduct should apply to all lawyers.168 
Thus, the rise of in-house lawyers as part of a new class of lawyer-employees 
and the statutory interpretation inquiries that this new class of lawyers triggers 
under the Rules (such as the application of Rule 1.5(a) to in-house pay or Rule 
5.6(a) to in-house noncompetes) reveal important questions about the future of 
the legal profession that the organized bar and all lawyers must begin to grap-
ple with. 
A. The Past: The One Profession Myth and the Corresponding One-Size-Fits-
All Regulatory Approach 
In the United States, the legal profession has long adhered to the idea of the 
one unified profession with the corresponding commitment of the Rules to reg-
ulate lawyers pursuant to a one-size-fits-all approach.169 Historically, the un-
derpinnings of this commitment were well grounded and documented. In its in-
fancy, as lawyers were seeking recognition as a profession,170 the notion of the 
One Profession was both necessary and accurate, indeed, through the nine-
teenth century the profession was largely homogenous, consisting predominant-
ly of White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant (WASP), middle- and upper-class men, 
engaged in general law practice centered upon litigation.171 To be sure, this 
homogeneity was the product of explicit discrimination and the exclusion of 
minorities and women attorneys, but the profession was homogeneous nonethe-
less.172 Thus, by the early twentieth century, the ABA Canons, codifying the 
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169  See supra text accompanying notes 60–63. 
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171  WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
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172  JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA 4 (1976); ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL 
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universal identity of the bar along the cornerstones of litigation as the paradig-
matic law practice, the hired gun client-centered ideology, and lawyers as au-
tonomous individual professionals, men, and WASP;173 were historically accu-
rate, reflective of the initial fears against immigrants, Catholics, and Jewish 
men (and later women and minorities), as well as against the rise of law firms, 
which threatened the then-dominant model of gentlemanly law practice.174 In 
other words, deep into the twentieth century the One Profession approach was 
not a myth but rather a reality. 
This professionalism project, aided by the organized bar’s promulgation 
and enforcement of rules of professional conduct based on the Canons, was 
immensely successful in establishing lawyers as professionals. By the mid-
1950s, attorneys’ elite status as lawyer-professionals, individuals who exercise 
discretion and common wisdom on behalf of clients; benefit from professional 
prerogatives others do not possess and cannot offer to clients like confidentiali-
ty and the attorney-client privilege; entitled to handsome compensation for their 
services; and regarded as a social and cultural governing class, was never seri-
ously challenged or threatened.175 And, although the bar was unable to use its 
professional status to restrict access to its ranks and prevent newcomers from 
entering the profession,176 it has used its newfound prestige and status to ex-
pand its influence, power, and monopoly during the New Deal era and the rise 
of the administrative state,177 as well as to defeat attempts to curb its self-
regulation and monopoly over the provision of legal services.178 
Post-World War II, the twentieth century featured, inter alia, two inter-
locking trends: the immense growth in the size of the bar and its diversity, and 
increased stratification. As the number of lawyers grew exponentially to gradu-
ally include women lawyers as well as minorities,179 and the practice of law 
broadened to include new areas of practice,180 the profession has become in-
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creasingly stratified, with BigLaw lawyers in the corporate hemisphere, mostly 
white men (although no longer exclusively WASP) rising to the top, and wom-
en, minorities, and others concentrated in the lower ranks of the corporate hem-
isphere and in the individual hemisphere.181 
Lawyers’ rules of professional conduct, first transitioning from the Canons 
into the Model Code and then to the Rules,182 have by and large ignored these 
trends and adhered to a one-size-fits-all approach centered on the traditional 
cornerstones of the profession for three interrelated reasons.183 First, this ap-
proach served the interests of the powerful elite atop the profession. A seem-
ingly universal merit-based approach, shaped in the image of white WASP 
men, protected this constituency from threats from women lawyers and others, 
for example, by generating new professional ideologies such as hyper-
competitiveness to legitimize and justify the status quo of the profession.184 
Second, and ironically, the one-size-fits-all approach has served the inter-
ests of all lawyers, including women and minorities. While internally, within 
the profession, the universal approach held newcomers into the profession 
back; externally, vis-à-vis nonlawyer competitors, ranging from accounting 
firms and multidisciplinary providers earlier in the second half of the twentieth 
century, to nonlawyer legal providers and global providers later, the universal 
approach served to protect the interests of the entire profession from outside 
competition.185 The One Profession, increasingly a myth given the immense 
size and diversity of the bar, nonetheless allowed all lawyers to claim profes-
sional status and exclude rising competitors. To that end, the Rules adhered to 
the one-size-fits-all approach, introducing patch after patch, mostly in response 
to the demise of litigation as the prominent embodiment of law practice.186 
Third, alternatives to the universal approach have proven hard to come by. 
While exposing the litigation, hired gun, male WASP, and individualistic bias-
es of the Rules was easy enough to do,187 coming up with satisfactory alterna-
tives has proven much harder, for both conceptual and practical reasons. Con-
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ceptually, envisioning an alternative universal approach is not a straightforward 
proposition. Consider the male WASP bias of the Rules. On the one hand, re-
vising the Rules to reduce their macho, aggressive, zealous, combative, twenty-
four-seven impulses seems appealing enough.188 Moreover, acknowledging the 
impact of facets of lawyers’ increasingly diverse personal identities on their 
professional identities would be both warranted and desirable.189 On the other 
hand, one would certainly be concerned about gender-specific references that 
would smack of a discriminatory “different rules for different lawyers” mindset 
and imply that gender might have something to do with one’s professional abil-
ities as a lawyer. Elsewhere, I advocated for an alternative universal approach, 
univertext rules, which take account of context without essentializing lawyers, 
but the political will to undertake and push for such a massive undertaking has 
not materialized.190 Practically, some have called for supplementing the Rules 
with specific codes meant to address the unique features of particular practice 
areas, but concerns have risen about jurisdictional disputes between codes, en-
forceability, as well as the ability to regulate lawyers with diverse practices.191 
The twenty-first century has complicated the picture even further. Inequali-
ty within the profession has never been greater with lawyers at the top taking 
advantage of structural changes in the practice of law after the Great Recession 
of 2008–2009, and of the emergence of new tracks and tiers of practice, to ce-
ment their elite position atop the profession.192 At the same time, as David Wil-
kins has pointed out, several trends such as the growing use of technology and 
globalization suggest the erosion of the traditional divide between the corporate 
and individual hemispheres and a natural organic return to a state of One Pro-
fession.193 This blurring of the divide between the traditional hemispheres and 
the possibility, inherent in it, of greater uniformity within the profession may 
serve to reduce the probability, not high to begin with, of generating the neces-
sary political will within the profession to revise the Rules. Consequently, a 
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well-intending ABA finds it hard to amend the Rules beyond relatively noncon-
troversial changes such as addressing the threats of cybersecurity to the practice 
of law.194 
B. The Rise of a New Class of Lawyer-Employees 
Against this already complex background, the rise of a class of lawyer-
employees, including in-house counsel, threatens and undermines the very 
premise of the One Profession myth and its regulatory one-size-fits-all counter-
part by questioning, for the first time, the assumption of lawyers, all lawyers, as 
individual autonomous powerful professionals. 
The new class of lawyer-employees consists of at least half a dozen con-
stituents. In addition to in-house lawyers who are employees of their entity cli-
ents, the class includes associates at law firms. Associates have always been, 
technically, law firm employees, yet recent developments in the practice of law 
have eroded their status. Historically, law firms featured only two classes of 
lawyers, associates and partners, with a third class, of counsel, essentially des-
ignating retired partners.195 The proliferation of tracks and classes of lawyers at 
law firms, and, in particular, the splitting of the partner track into equity and 
income tiers,196 have meant not only the extension of the time law firm lawyers 
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spend in statuses other than equity partner but the devaluation of the associate 
rank. An associate is no longer a member of the second-ranked class of lawyers 
at a law firm with two classes, she is at best a member of the third-ranked class, 
and at firms that have broken up their associate class into junior, middle, and 
senior tiers based on competencies and expectancies, even worse than that.197 
While historically most associates did not make (equity) partner, making 
partner was the formal expectation and the official result of the tournament of 
lawyers for all associates, and law firms helped place the “losers”, those who 
did not make partner, in positions of relative high status and pay.198 Increased 
mobility as the “new normal” reality at law firms has changed that expectation. 
When most associates expect to laterally move between law firms, do not ex-
pect to make partner or to reap professional rewards and status akin to making 
partner, and do not expect to display loyalty or receive the benefits of it from 
their law firms, their status as lawyer-employees as opposed to lawyer-
professionals-in-the-making is amplified,199 reflected, for example, in calls for 
them to unionize.200 
Next, the class of lawyer-employees includes income (or salaried) partners, 
who, other than by empty title, share many employment features with associ-
ates. They are compensated by means of a salary rather than a share of the law 
firm’s profits, shoulder no risk of loss, and have no rights in management.201 
While recent scholarly attention has been focused on the status of income part-
ners as employees for purposes of their ability to file Title VII anti-
discrimination lawsuits,202 these lawyer-employees are generally employees ra-
ther than partners in terms of their authority, discretion, and status within law 
firms. 
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The lawyer-employee class also includes staff attorneys, lawyer-employees 
at law firms, who are not considered partnership-track material and have no 
meaningful possibility of promotion.203 This category of “permanent associ-
ates” includes both experienced attorneys who have been taken off the partner-
ship track,204 and less experienced lawyers who are given low-grade assign-
ments such as document review and due diligence tasks, and usually receive 
low hourly pay and few if any benefits.205 Notably, as lawyer-employees, staff 
attorneys are far removed from the historical ideal of the lawyer-professional. 
Unlike associates and income partners who in meaningful ways are still power-
ful professionals, staff attorneys resemble more traditional weak-employees in 
orientation and status in the workplace. 
Further along the lawyer-employee/lawyer-professional continuum are 
temporary and contract lawyers.206 Indeed, temporary lawyers are often not 
employees at all but rather independent-contractors who possess little profes-
sional status. Often employed not by law firms but rather by placement agen-
cies, temporary lawyers tend to assist law firms with short-term projects or 
surge in demand for low-grade tasks. 
In the past few years, large law firms have begun employing temporary attor-
neys, at hourly rates with no benefits, to perform low-level legal tasks, such as 
large-scale document reviews and coding. The depressing reports, keyed in by 
temporary attorney bloggers, read more like an account of pre-Lochner era 
working conditions than a professional, autonomous work environment. The 
anonymous temporary attorney bloggers tell stories of spending long hours in 
front of computer screens reviewing and coding documents in dreggy basement 
workspaces with dead cockroaches on the floor, blocked exits, and overflowing 
bathrooms. Workers must obtain permission to use the bathroom and are not al-
lowed to leave the premises to, for instance, walk outside to get a cup of coffee, 
unless it is during the forty-five minute lunch time allocation. Temporary attor-
neys do not do legal research, they do not go to court, and do not ever meet with 
clients. The attorneys who take these temporary jobs graduated from low-tier in-
stitutions and do not have the academic credentials to acquire jobs as associates 
at the large law firms.207 
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To be sure, the spread of such temporary or contingent employment is not 
unique to law or the legal profession.208 Yet, within the legal profession, the 
rise of contract and temporary lawyering is significant because it reflects the 
erosion of professional status and rise of the lawyer-employee as an alternative 
model to the traditional lawyer-professional.209 As noted by Lucille Jewel, 
“[w]ith temporary attorneys, large law firms appear to have created a new law-
yer underclass that greatly conflicts with the idea that attorneys are members of 
a noble, autonomous profession.”210 
Finally, the class of lawyer-employees and independent-contractors in-
cludes outsourced attorneys. This latter category often consists of foreign 
common law attorneys who work for either “affiliated” foreign law firms of 
U.S. firms or for foreign placement agencies and typically provide low-grade 
legal services off-site (and out-of-sight).211 
There are many differences between the various constituents of the lawyer-
employee class, especially between staff, temporary and outsourced lawyers on 
the one hand, and in-house, associate, and income partner lawyers on the other, 
but importantly they all share one key feature. As lawyer-employees, they are 
increasingly removed from the defining characteristic of lawyers, all lawyers, 
as individual autonomous independent powerful professionals. 
A constitutive definitional cornerstone of the lawyer-professional has been 
that lawyers qua lawyers, at the core of what they do as lawyers, have the au-
tonomy, power, and discretion to exercise independent, individualized profes-
sional judgment over the intellectual aspects of their jobs, that is, to exercise 
practical wisdom on behalf of clients.212 In this sense, lawyers have long been 
powerful vis-à-vis their clients, deploying independent autonomous judgment 
over a sphere of knowledge and skill clients knew little about.213 Such exercise 
of individual, autonomous independent discretion has resulted in the acquisition 
of status, professional status, which distinguished and defined the lawyer-
professional as a unique service provider.214 
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To be sure, the individual-autonomous-independent-powerful assumption 
is not and has long not been an absolute “set in stone” definition of all lawyers’ 
roles and practices. In the individual hemisphere there are certainly the Mutos 
of the world, immigration lawyers trying to balance an impossibly heavy case-
load of clients they hardly know while being squeezed by so-called “travel 
agencies” who supply the clients and influence, if not dominate, the lawyers’ 
practice.215 Yet paradigmatic solo and small-firm practitioners, notwithstanding 
the undeniable challenges inherent in their practice, have continued in a mean-
ingful way to exercise power and status as professionals vis-à-vis their typically 
vulnerable clients, such as disenfranchised criminal defendants facing incarcer-
ation, immigrants facing deportation, and tenants facing eviction.216 
Similarly, in the corporate hemisphere, large law firm partners have lost 
power and influence to in-house lawyers and their corporate clients, and exer-
cise decreased professional autonomy within their own firms, which in turn ex-
ercise greater centralized control over decision-making.217 Yet, BigLaw equity 
partners continue to benefit from elevated status within the profession and not-
withstanding their relative loss of power and influence to in-house counsel, 
they benefit from top compensation and prestige.218 
Some lawyer-employees, in contrast, fundamentally contradict inherent 
facets of the autonomous powerful professional assumption. Staff and contract 
lawyers, as we have seen, have very little, if any, autonomy as lawyers over the 
exercise of professional judgment and over questions of intellectual appeal that 
call for the use of practical wisdom. Performing low-grade tasks, they are hard-
ly ever in a position to exercise meaningful professional judgment over ques-
tions of significance, and their work product is closely supervised by other 
lawyers, typically associates. These lawyer-employees are often weak in every 
aspect of their practice vis-à-vis other lawyers and clients. With regard to other 
lawyers, lawyer-employees practice in highly hierarchal environments: their 
work product is vertically scrutinized with no meaningful opportunities for 
growth and development in responsibilities, and they often receive little train-
ing and no mentorship. Furthermore, staff and contract lawyer-employees typi-
cally have very little to no contact with clients,219 indeed, sometimes clients are 
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unaware of the existence or role of some staff, temporary, and outsourced at-
torneys.220 Lacking the core constitutive characteristics of professionalism, 
lawyer-employees as a class thus represent a challenge to the very traditional 
understanding of lawyers as professionals and the practice of law as a profes-
sion. Notably, this challenge is not only real, it is likely permanent: structural 
changes and the creation of new tracks within the profession suggest that law-
yer-employees are here to stay.221 
Interestingly, while the growing class of lawyer-employees threatens the 
professional status of the profession as a whole and raises intriguing questions 
about the regulation of lawyers, it has not yet affected the status of lawyer-
employees externally vis-à-vis the public. To the extent that many in the public 
do not have an accurate appreciation of what it is that lawyers do and, in partic-
ular, of the differences, for example, between equity partners, income partners, 
associates, and staff attorneys at a law firm, they may continue to confer on all 
lawyers, including lawyer-employees, the elevated status of lawyer-
professionals.222 This phenomenon, described by Meir Dan-Cohan as acoustic 
separation,223 may be temporary. Unlike some aspects of the law and of law 
practice that lay members of the public may be unable to observe, key features 
of the status of lawyer-employees, such as their relative low pay and lack of 
benefits and job insecurity will become, over time, visible. 
It is somewhat ironic, and possibly quite misleading, that early scholarly 
reaction to the rise of lawyer-employees has focused on income partners and 
associates at BigLaw,224 as well as on in-house lawyers as employees.225 To be 
clear, the bifurcation of the traditional partner status into equity (read “real”) 
and income partners is a significant phenomenon with tangible consequences 
worthy of investigation.226 Similarly, the work conditions of BigLaw associates 
deserve scrutiny.227 Yet, income partners and BigLaw associates, the many 
challenges that face them notwithstanding, continue to benefit from relative 
elite status within the profession and certainly enjoy handsome pay.228 More 
importantly, they continue to meet some aspects of the fundamental assumption 
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of professionalism—they are autonomous, relatively powerful, professionals. 
Put differently, income partners and BigLaw associates do feature some charac-
teristics of being employees, but they are, relatively speaking, powerful em-
ployees. Thinking of them as the paradigmatic face of the lawyer-employees 
class is thus misleading and risks diverting attention from the plight of weak 
lawyer-employees. Similarly, in-house lawyers, while certainly employees of 
their entity-clients in the conventional sense of an employer-employee relation-
ship, are for the most part powerful employees who retain many of the tradi-
tional core aspects of lawyer-professionals, such that focusing on them as an 
exemplar of lawyer-employees may be distracting with regard to the challenges 
of weak lawyer-employees. 
The rise of the lawyer-employee class raises at least two important ques-
tions about the future of the legal profession and its regulation. Can the profes-
sion responsibly and morally adhere to the myth of the One Profession in the 
face of practice realities that reveal the growing gap between lawyer-
professionals and lawyer-employees? The question, to be sure, is anything but 
academic. Consider the implications for legal education. It is one thing to re-
quire a law degree that costs hundreds of thousands of dollars and takes seven 
years to pursue as a condition precedent for obtaining a license to practice law 
when “in America the law is King[,]”229 and when most lawyers, at least over 
time, become members of the governing class,230 a de facto aristocracy,231 and 
highly compensated professionals.232 It is altogether a different proposition 
when some lawyers are destined to become lawyer-employees, with low status, 
low pay, and job insecurity, not to mention crippling debt.233 
Or consider the implications for the monopoly of the legal profession over 
the provision of legal services. Some attention has been given as of late to the 
question of whether some lawyers can opt out of the lawyer-professional identi-
ty for the purpose of rejecting certain professional obligations and with them 
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corresponding professional prerogatives,234 whereas other commentators have 
wondered about the ability of the legal profession to protect its turf against 
nonlawyer competitors and technology offering legal services.235 The rise of 
the lawyer-employee class, however, presents a related yet distinctively differ-
ent question: must the legal profession, responsibly and morally, cede ground 
and de-regulate at least low-grade tasks to allow for greater competition and 
address some of the reasons that have given rise to the new class of lawyer-
employees? 
With regard to regulation, can the ABA responsibly and morally adhere to 
the Rules’ one-size-fits-all approach? In the words of the Chism court, lawyer-
employees present a question “at the intersection of judicial power over the 
practice of law and legislative power over the conditions of employment.”236 
Whereas the Rules purport to guide the conduct of lawyers and regulate it in the 
public interest and to the benefit of clients and the public, “the legislature has 
passed extensive legislation with the purpose of protecting employee wages . . . 
against any diminution or deduction . . . [and] to prevent abuses by employers 
. . . reflect[ing] the legislature’s strong policy in favor of payment of wages to 
employees.”237 Insisting on a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach in the face of 
a rising class of lawyer-employees, and, specifically, subjecting lawyer-
employees to the Rules, amounts to a decision to favor judicial power over leg-
islative power when it comes to lawyer-employees’ rights and obligations. This 
is not a decision that the ABA (and courts) necessarily have the power to make, 
and in any event, it is not a decision that the ABA (and courts) should make 
casually. 
C. In-House Pay, Lawyer-Employees, Lawyer-Professionals and the Future of 
the Legal Profession 
The regulation of in-house pay, viewed from the perspective of the grow-
ing divide between lawyer-professionals and lawyer-employees, provides a 
compelling example of the risks inherent in ignoring the sea change in the prac-
tice of law. Against this background, the construction of “fees” in Rule 1.5(a) 
to encompass in-house lawyers’ salaries, bonuses and nonmonetary benefits 
takes on a whole new meaning, as it would open the door to allow courts and 
the Rules to have a say in the regulation of employee salaries. In this sense, the 
issue of in-house compensation is but a symptom of a seismic change effecting 
not only the Rules and regulation of lawyers but indeed the conception and 
meaning of lawyers as professionals and of the legal profession. 
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In-house pay is a real, timely question in need of addressing. Amending the 
Rules or interpreting them sensibly to subject in-house compensation to a rea-
sonableness requirement as construed above is the right thing to do, as long as 
we avoid the folly of regulating powerful lawyer-employees as if they represent 
the typical lawyer-employees, setting a dangerous precedent for the regulation 
of weak lawyer-employees; understand the impact of regulating in-house law-
yers on all lawyers; and begin to address the challenges facing weak lawyer-
employees. 
First, it is imperative to remember that in-house lawyers are powerful law-
yer-employees, a subgroup of lawyer-employee that is the exception to the 
class in that it much resembles lawyer-professionals such as equity partners as 
opposed to traditional weak lawyer-employees. This quality of in-house law-
yers both explains why it is appropriate to subject them to Rule 1.5(a)’s reason-
ableness requirement and why it may not be appropriate to subject other, weak, 
lawyer-employees to the Rule. This concern, to be sure, is far from academic. 
Consider the initial anecdotal evidence from the marketplace indicating that in-
house legal departments are hiring contract lawyers.238 If a new class of in-
house contract lawyers emerges following the model of BigLaw contract law-
yers, featuring low-level legal tasks, hourly rates, and no benefits,239 then au-
tomatically subjecting these weak lawyer-employees to Rule 1.5(a)’s reasona-
bleness would be inappropriate and undesirable. It will allow entity-clients to 
use 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement, meant to protect them as a shield 
against powerful abusive lawyer-professionals, as a sword against weak law-
yer-employees, legitimizing what Lucille Jewel has called “Lochner era work-
ing conditions.”240 And it will indirectly allow courts, exercising power over 
the practice of law, to infringe on traditional “legislative power over the condi-
tions of employment.”241 
Similarly, one should not infer from the regulation of in-house pay that all 
the rules of professional conduct should apply to all lawyer-employees. Con-
sider Rule 1.10 and Brown v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and Mo-
tor Vehicles.242 Rule 1.10(a) generally imputes a conflict of interest from one 
lawyer to another lawyer “associated in a firm,” such that if one lawyer is taint-
ed by a conflict of interest, all lawyers in the firms are disqualified by the same 
conflict.243 Brown explored the novel question of whether conflicts of interest 
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can be imputed from a contract or outsourced attorney to the employing law 
firm. As an Assistant Attorney General for the Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Florida (“OAG”), attorney Moore represented the Defendant, the 
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”), in its 
case against Plaintiff, Ms. Brown. After leaving her employment at OAG, Ms. 
Moore took employment as a contract attorney with the very law firm that has 
been representing Plaintiff against DHSMV. Defendant promptly moved to 
disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel arguing that Ms. Moore’s conflict of interest 
should be imputed to the firm.244 Notably, the court interpreted the term of art 
associated in a firm in Rule 1.10 to mean that the lawyer in question must be a 
traditional associate rather than a contract attorney. Accordingly, the court held 
that conflicts of interest cannot be imputed from a contract attorney to a law 
firm.245 Notably, several ethics opinions considering the imputation of a tempo-
rary contract lawyer’s conflicts to a hiring firm under versions of Rule 1.10 fo-
cused on the temporary lawyer’s access to the firm’s confidential client infor-
mation,246 yet even these opinions considered the status of the temporary 
lawyer as a relevant factor in deciding the imputation question.247 
Second, even if one remains diligent not to construe the application of Rule 
1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement to in-house pay broadly to mean either that 
all lawyer-employees should be subject to a reasonableness constraint or that 
all the rules of professional conduct apply to all lawyer-employees, regulating 
in-house pay still has profound impact on the regulation of all lawyers. 
Recall the proposed amendment to Rule 5.6(a), pursuant to which in-house 
lawyers may be a party to a reasonable noncompete provision as part of a stock 
grant or stock option agreement.248 The amendment may be necessary to ad-
dress the practice realities of in-house lawyers, nonetheless, it contradicts the 
one-size-fits-all commitment of the Rules in that it curve a special exception 
from the noncompete prohibition for in-house lawyers. To be sure, the Rules on 
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occasion treat different lawyers differently. For example, Rule 3.3 imposes 
special disclosure duties on trial attorneys and litigators,249 and Rule 3.8 impos-
es special responsibilities on prosecutors.250 Yet these rules are best understood 
not as curving exceptions for litigators and prosecutors but rather as addressing 
unique aspects of these lawyers’ roles, that is, Rules 3.3 and 3.8 are simply in-
applicable to other lawyers. In contrast, the proposed amendment to Rule 5.6(a) 
is of a different sort. It does not impose a professional duty on in-house law-
yers, rather, it accommodates their practice realities and although this exception 
may be necessary to allow in-house lawyers to do their job, it nonetheless un-
dercuts the Rules’ one-size-fits-all commitment. 
Finally, addressing the practice realities of powerful lawyer-employees, 
such as in-house lawyers and BigLaw associates, risks obscuring and ignoring 
the needs and practice realities of weak lawyer-employees. Consider the sala-
ries of law firm associates or the profits of equity partners. While the fees a law 
firm charges each one of its clients must be reasonable per Rule 1.5(a), neither 
associate salaries nor partner profits—although both are indirectly a product of 
such fees—are subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Rule. As we 
have seen, Rule 1.5(a) and Section 34 aim to regulate client payment for legal 
services, which explain both why associate and partner pay should not be and 
have not been subject to a reasonableness requirements. Clients do not pay the 
salaries of associates or the profits of partners, law firms do. As long as the un-
derlying fees each client pays are reasonable, the question of how to compen-
sate associates and partners is conceptually a secondary inquiry that has noth-
ing to do with clients. 
Nothing is wrong with this line of reasoning, except that in dealing with 
lawyer-professionals (equity partners) and once again with relatively powerful 
lawyer-employees (BigLaw associates) it obscures an important question re-
garding weak lawyer-employees: should the Rules address the practice realities 
of contract, staff and temporary lawyers? Although addressing this issue falls 
outside the scope of this Article, there is no denying that the question is real 
and is made more pressing by addressing the needs and practice realities of 
powerful lawyer-employees, in-house attorneys. 
The principal rule amendment proposed in this Article—subjecting in-
house pay to Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement—addresses a timely is-
sue of practical import while punting on the broader challenge of the future 
regulation of different classes of lawyers by crafting rules that adhere to the 
one-size-fits-all approach of the ABA. In particular, the proposed changes are 
drafted to apply to powerful lawyer-employees, in-house lawyers, while not af-
fecting the status of weak lawyer-employees, such as contract and temporary 
attorneys, and the Article explicitly cautions against future mechanical applica-
tion of other Rules to weak lawyer-employees. Yet such punting, which takes 
for granted the one-size-fits-all regulatory approach, is admittedly a short-term 
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fix. The ABA must undertake a thoughtful study of the future of attorney regu-
lation, coming to terms with the rise of a new class of lawyer-employees and 
the possibility of the demise of the idea of the One Profession. 
III. IN-HOUSE PAY AS THE FAULT LINE  
BETWEEN LAWYER-PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYER-BUSINESSPERSONS 
Analysis of the reasonableness of in-house pay reveals the multifaceted na-
ture of in-house lawyers’ roles and tasks. In addition to traditional legal func-
tions, in-house lawyers perform many administrative, business and managerial 
tasks, and invest ample soft hours building their human capital within the enti-
ty-client.251 The non-legal aspects of in-house lawyers’ work impact not only 
the understanding of in-house pay, but also shed a light on the regulation of all 
lawyers and the future of law practice. 
A.The Traditional Business-Professionalism Dichotomy 
For over a century now, the business-professionalism debate has been rag-
ing among lawyers and critics, centered on the question of whether the practice 
of law has become a business as opposed to a profession.252 Traditionally 
phrased in terms of a decline of professionalism or a paradigm shift from pro-
fessionalism to a business model, commentators often assume a golden era of 
professionalism that has eroded, replaced by business ethos.253 Yet the practice 
of law has always been a business, at least in the sense that most lawyers, in 
whatever real or imagined revered past, have practiced law for pay representing 
clients’ private interests. Rather than binary opposites, law has always been a 
complex tapestry, in some ways a business that has long aspired and pro-
claimed to be a profession, a mosaic in which business and professionalism are 
but two facets of a practice in which claims of a decline mean a gradual move 
toward business and away from professionalism.254 
Specifically, some have argued that a modern, new breed of lawyer-
businesspersons increasingly understand their roles as client-centered service 
providers who zealously pursue clients’ private interests subject only to the 
law.255 Whereas in the past lawyer-professionals were willing to subject their 
own self-interest to the interests of their clients, and were committed to advis-
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ing clients to pursue their interests consistent with public interest, or, at least, 
not strongly inconsistent with it, that paradigm of law practice has eroded. 
Lawyer-businesspersons abandon any allegiance to the public interest and the 
public good as officers of the legal system and as public citizens, unless the 
public interest is defined as nothing more than an aggregate of the private inter-
ests of clients.256 
Critics of this new breed of lawyers split into two camps. Some argue that 
professionalism itself is a myth, a mystique, an impossibility fabricated by law-
yers (and other professionals) to justify and legitimize their status, monopoly 
over the provision of legal services, and noncompetitive fees. Uniting scholars 
from the right and the left, the critique asserts that lawyers who advocate for 
private interests for pay have no reason and will not advocate for any public in-
terest inconsistent with their paying clients’ private interests and their own self-
interest in keeping their paying clients happy.257 The lawyer-professional was, 
to these critics, more a rhetorical tool than an actual commitment, and, to the 
extent that it did, at one point in time, reflect the actual beliefs and commit-
ments of some lawyers, it has since fallen out of favor. Moreover, even if law-
yers did wish, inexplicably, to advocate for a public interest different than their 
own self-interest or their clients’ private interests, their public advocacy will be 
undesirable turning them into lawyer-philosophers, or worse, unelected lawyer-
kings dominating the public discourse and interest.258 For these critics, the only 
appropriate remedy for the decline of the lawyer-professional is the de-
professionalization and de-mystification of the legal profession, openly admit-
ting that the practice of law is little more than a service industry and opening it 
up to competition by nonlawyers as legal service providers.259 
Other critics take a more sympathetic approach to professionalism, docu-
menting that some lawyers, both prominent leaders of the bar and ordinary 
members, used to and still do regularly act as lawyer-professionals.260 Social-
ized into the practice of law understood to be a profession, some lawyers mani-
fested professionalism both by regularly moving back and forth between pri-
vate and public practices,261 and by trying to persuade and influence their 
clients to pursue their private interests consistent with the public interest or, at 
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least, not inconsistent with the public good.262 Understanding their role to be 
that of a governing class, mitigating the interests of private clients and of the 
public, such lawyers routinely acted as professionals by subjecting their own 
interests to those of their clients and by attempting to inform and shape their 
clients’ interests in the public spirit.263 According to commentators of this per-
suasion, the problem with the legal profession is not that professionalism itself 
is essentially a sham or a myth.264 Rather, a complex interplay of economic, po-
litical, ideological, and cultural forces has gradually turned lawyers (and their 
clients) away from the vision of the lawyer-professional and toward the busi-
ness pulse of the continuum, in which law is a business and lawyers serve the 
private interests of clients and little (or nothing) more.265 
For these critics, the move forward consists of a multipronged, time-
consuming professionalism reform agenda. It includes a redemption project, 
reinventing professionalism to develop an account of it that lawyers can and 
should believe in, identifying a role for lawyers as advocates of the public 
good.266 It also includes an account of how such a reimagined conception of 
professionalism can and ought to be adopted and championed by legal institu-
tions, from law schools to law firms and bar associations, all engaged in efforts 
to socialize and internalize professionalism as an integral constitutive part of 
the practice of law.267 Finally, it includes an effort to explain how this account 
of professionalism may survive inhospitable dominant economic, political, ide-
ological, and cultural forces within and outside of the legal profession, accepted 
by clients and the public at large.268 
B.  In-House Pay and the Rise of a New Conception of Lawyer-
Businesspersons 
Enter in-house practice. As in-house counsel grew in influence and prestige 
and their roles expanded and matured, the scholarship about in-house counsel 
began to gain steam.269 An understandable tendency among scholars has been 
 
262  SMIGEL, supra note 172, at 342; see also 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938) (de-
scribing Mr. Root’s belief that it was a lawyer’s role to tell clients when appropriate that 
“they are damned fools and should stop.”). 
263  Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Busi-
ness/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal Pro-
fessionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 24 (2005). 
264  POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 257, at 186. 
265  Wald & Pearce, Being Good Lawyers, supra note 256, at 611–12. 
266  See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in 
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 230–31 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). 
267  Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Making Good Lawyers, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 429–30 
(2011). 
268  Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Con-
fronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 
39 (2011). 
269  Supra text accompanying notes 34–40. 
296 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1  
to impose and apply the traditional business-professionalism dichotomy to in-
house lawyers.270 For those calling for de-professionalization, in-house practice 
constitutes a stark example of the fallacy of the lawyer-professional ideal: in-
house lawyers serve the private interests of the entity-client and only those in-
terests. To expect them to pursue any other interests, let alone some abstract 
and often poorly articulated version of the public good, is to misunderstand 
what in-house lawyers, and indeed, what all lawyers do, and to fall victim to 
the mystique of professionalism. In-house lawyers cannot, do not, and should 
not pursue any interest other than those of the entity-client subject only to the 
law. They are, and they reveal, the true face of all members of the bar as law-
yer-businesspersons.271 
For those who believe in the possibility of the revival of the lawyer-
professional, in-house counsel represent a tough challenge. Embedded within 
their clients and lacking independence, in-house lawyers may find it incredibly 
hard to practice as lawyer-professionals, even if a viable, credible account of 
professionalism were to emerge. Thus, attempts by leading in-house counsel to 
portray themselves as the new lawyer-statespersons who act as the moral con-
science of the entity-client are not outright rejected but are taken with a grain of 
salt.272 
The in-house pay analysis reveals, however, a new perspective. It shows 
that in-house practice does not fit into the “de-professionalize” or the “redemp-
tion” paradigms. Rather, it exposes a new friction or a new fault line in the 
business-profession dichotomy. Within the confines of the traditional business-
profession debate, it has always been understood and assumed that the practice 
of law as such had real, well-defined content such that the disagreement was 
not whether the practice of law existed but rather whether it was (more of) a 
profession or a business. 
To be sure, the assumption of law practice as a real meaningful concept 
was neither jurisprudentially naïve nor simplistic. Assuming law has discerna-
ble identifiable qualities, to allow one to debate whether it is a profession or a 
business, does not entail a retreat to Formalism. Post Realism, hardly any law-
yer reasonably believes law is an independent, self-contained body of esoteric 
knowledge.273 Of course law is more than a body of statutes, case law and doc-
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trine. It is also what the judge (and legislator, and lawyer, and client) had for 
breakfast, shaped and informed by, while shaping and informing, politics and 
culture, intersecting with bodies of knowledge as diverse as economics (of the 
client, of the lawyer and at large), history, sociology, anthropology, and psy-
chology, not to mention literature, feminism, race relations, and queer stud-
ies.274 
At the same time, however, law was assumed to have a core, an essence, 
which was unique and discernable.275 Karl Llewellyn has taught us all that to be 
an effective lawyer one has to be interdisciplinary.276 For example, to under-
stand the client’s objectives a lawyer has to be a part-time economist and psy-
chologist, and to effectively serve the client’s interests one has to understand 
jury selection processes and states of mind, be mindful of judges’ moods, and 
master public relations and the manipulation of the court of public opinion.277 
But, importantly, all of these bodies of knowledge and expertise were at the 
service of a legal core. When representing a client in litigation, a lawyer prac-
ticed “law” when she drafted a complaint (or an answer), filed various addi-
tional pleadings, negotiated a settlement in the shadow of trial, prepared for tri-
al and litigated it. When representing a client in a transaction, a lawyer 
practiced “law” when she converted term sheets into legal documents, translat-
ed business risks into legal risks, negotiated the various aspects of the deal, and 
helped close it. In this sense, assuming the existence of the practice of law, as-
suming that there was a “there” there,278 was not naïve. Rather, it assumed the 
existence of a legal core, which was the practice of law, even as it was inher-
ently interwoven into other bodies of peripheral knowledge. 
Similarly, the assumption of law in the business-profession debate was not 
simplistic, acknowledging the many business facets of law practice above and 
beyond the important observation that most lawyers run a business in the sense 
that they charge fees for the services they provide and in that they pay their 
employees, for office space and for expenses related to the practice of law with 
the intent to make a profit. Consider a BigLaw partner engaged in non-billable 
business-development (Biz-Dev) activities. Biz-Dev has become a meaningful 
aspect of BigLaw partners’ professional lives, an integral and significant part of 
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what they, or at least, what successful equity partners do.279 As important as 
Biz-Dev is, however, it is adjunct to and in the service of the practice of law as 
a distinct core separate from business. Biz-Dev is pursued not as an end-on-to-
itself but to allow the partner to then practice law. Indeed, even relationship 
rain-making partners who engage near-exclusively in Biz-Dev and hardly prac-
tice law (increasingly a rarity in a world in which powerful general counsel re-
fuse to pay for associates’ time and expect the partners to actually do the work, 
that is, practice law),280 do so to identify and generate work for their team 
members who will mine the relationships for legal billable work.281 In other 
words, to belittle the importance and relevance of Biz-Dev to the practice of 
BigLaw’s equity partners is to misunderstand their practice of law, at the same 
time as Biz-Dev is fundamentally secondary to and in the service of a core of 
law practice. 
In-house practice and in-house pay challenge the core of law practice. 
Some in-house lawyers, namely powerful general counsel who often also serve 
as chief legal officers or who are otherwise members of the entity-client’s man-
agement team, do not practice law as the core of what they do. Rather, at the 
core of what they do is business management and leadership, informed by their 
knowledge and mastery of the law. No doubt, at times these general counsel act 
as “cops,” primarily acting as lawyers for the entity in the traditional legal 
sense.282 Fundamentally, however, at other, perhaps most times, acting as 
“counsel” and as “business leaders,” these general counsel are practicing busi-
ness, not law.283 They are not lawyer-professionals but rather lawyer-
businesspersons, and in acting as lawyer-businesspersons they threaten, move 
away from, and change the meaning of the core of law in the “practice of law” 
not only for themselves but for all lawyers in the legal profession. 
One may retort that general counsel as lawyer-businesspersons do not chal-
lenge the meaning of the practice of law any more than a near-exclusively rela-
tional equity partner at BigLaw does. The argument might proceed as follows: 
most lawyers (and nonlawyers) at BigLaw practice law and support it, and the 
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very Biz-Dev activities of relational equity partners are geared toward generat-
ing legal work for others engaged in the practice of law. Similarly, even if 
powerful general counsel do not primarily practice law, their business practice 
depends on and is adjacent to the work of all lawyers in the in-house legal de-
partment and outside of it throughout the entity-client, who do practice law in 
the more traditional, core, sense. 
On closer reflection, however, this argument fails. General counsel’s role 
as lawyer-businesspersons is not secondary to, or in the service of, the work of 
lawyers in and outside of the in-house department. Quite the contrary, general 
counsel’s work is in the service of the business management of the entity-
client. It does not depend on the work of lawyers in the in-house legal depart-
ment in the symbiotic manner in which Biz-Dev depends on lawyers to mine 
the legal work. Rather, the entire orientation of general counsel’s work is busi-
ness, not law, with a typical promotion being an advancement into the C-Suite 
for a nonlegal position.284 
In-house pay captures this challenge to the core of law practice. Suppose 
the Rules were amended (or interpreted) to impose a reasonableness require-
ment on in-house pay. Could entity-clients bypass the requirement by bifurcat-
ing a general counsel’s compensation package, paying a reasonable pay for le-
gal services rendered, and an “unreasonable” pay or, at least, a second payment 
not subject to a reasonableness requirement, for business services rendered? 
Relatedly, to bypass the prohibition in the Rules against noncompetes, can enti-
ty-clients grant their in-house lawyers stock and stock options subject to a non-
compete provision for their business, as opposed to legal, services?285 
The Rules answer these questions with an impassioned “no.” Rule 5.7(b) 
states that “[t]he term ‘law-related services’ denotes services that might reason-
ably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provi-
sion of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of 
law when provided by a nonlawyer,”286 a definition that perfectly describes the 
business work of in-house counsel. Rule 5.7(a)(1) then states in relevant part 
that “[a] lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with re-
spect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the 
law-related services are provided [] by the lawyer in circumstances that are not 
distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients.”287 According-
ly, in-house practice is subject to the Rules, including Rules 1.5(a) and 5.6(a), 
because pursuant to Rule 5.7 the business practice of in-house lawyers is insep-
arable from their practice of law, even if it dominates and undercuts the core 
practice of “law” in its traditional sense. 
The Rules’ statutory answer is echoed by leading elite general counsel. Ben 
Heineman and Norman Veasey, for example, insist that law practice and legal 
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identity are inherent to the ability of in-house lawyers to act as guardians and 
the conscience of their entity-clients. Divorcing the legal from the non-legal as-
pects of what in-house lawyers do would pull the rug from under the ability of 
these lawyers to perform their jobs well.288 
The Rules’ clear-cut stance, however, does little more than reveal the pro-
fession’s anxiety over the potential sea of change it is facing. The profession, or 
at least, its elite leaders, would like to adhere to the old ideal of the lawyer-
professional and reject its threatening and unknown counterpart, the lawyer-
businessperson. The lawyer-businessperson, by practicing law and business as 
equal parts or worse, by subjecting law to business, undermines the core of law 
as a distinctive practice. As such, the practice of law by lawyer-businesspersons 
opens the door to the discussion the profession has long been able to avoid 
about what is, and is not, the practice of law for purposes of the regulation of 
law, legal providers, and the monopoly over the provision of legal services.289 
In the short run, the Rules can be amended or interpreted to impose a rea-
sonableness requirement on in-house pay,290 and Rule 5.7(a)(1) can continue to 
provide that in-house practice is either the practice of law or a mix of law and 
“law-related services,” subject to the Rules.291 In the long run, however, the 
profession will be foolish to ignore and deny the fundamental questions and 
challenges raised by in-house practice and in-house pay. In-house lawyers are 
lawyer-employees, not lawyer-professionals, and regulation of their roles re-
quires coming to terms with the rise of the lawyer-employee as a challenge to 
the centuries-old dominant paradigm of the lawyer-professional. Some in-house 
lawyers are also lawyer-businesspersons, not lawyer-professionals, and their 
practice and applicable rules of conduct must reflect a reckoning with the chal-
lenges posed by the lawyer-businessperson to the lawyer-professional ideal. 
CONCLUSION 
The regulation of in-house pay, namely, whether in-house salaries, bonus-
es, stock grants, stock options, and nonmonetary benefits are subject to a rea-
sonableness requirement, and if so, what reasonableness means in this context, 
presents complex questions of statutory interpretation. Answering these ques-
tions requires exploring the plain language meaning of various statutory provi-
sions, as well as examining their various policy rationales and objectives. As it 
turns out, however, the best interpretation of the Rules, pursuant to which in-
house pay must be reasonable, is but the tip of an iceberg. The questions sur-
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rounding in-house pay reveal and demonstrate fundamental changes in the 
practice of law: the decline of the lawyer-professional paradigm and the rise of 
two distinct but sometimes intersecting alternatives, the lawyer-employee and 
the lawyer-businessperson. These new paradigms require a close examination 
of not only particular rules of professional conduct and the entire regulatory 
approach to the practice of law and the provision of legal services, but also of 
the role of lawyers and the meaning of law. This is an important and timely un-
dertaking, in which this Article constitutes but the first step. 
Moreover, the decline of the lawyer-professional and the rise of the lawyer-
employee and the lawyer-businessperson have important consequences outside 
of the law, far beyond understanding changes to the historical roles of lawyer-
professionals as representatives of clients, officers of the legal system and pub-
lic citizens.292 Consider this opening shot: U.S. corporate law has long regulat-
ed executive compensation as a matter of the duty of care subject to the pre-
sumption of the Business Judgment Rule of corporate agents.293 Executive 
compensation is immune from substantive judicial scrutiny as long as the deci-
sion-makers who set the compensation have done so on an informed basis, 
leading courts to defer to their business judgment and expertise.294 If, however, 
in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness requirement, and if, as explained in 
this Article, the rationale for imposing such a requirement is in part a fiduciary 
duty owed by in-house lawyers as fiduciaries to their entity-clients to abstain 
from “taking undue advantage” of the entity-clients “in direct dealings between 
them,”295 then the regulation of in-house pay and of in-house lawyers as fiduci-
aries suggests a new way to think about executive compensation and the regula-
tion of corporate agents more broadly. Perhaps U.S. corporate law has been 
wrong to focus on those who make executive compensation decisions and 
whether they were informed in making their decisions, and instead ought to fo-
cus, learning from in-house lawyers and the regulation of in-house pay, on 
those who receive executive compensation. If in-house pay is subject to an ob-
jective and substantive reasonableness requirement because the lawyers who 
receive it are fiduciaries of entity-clients who cannot receive unreasonable pay, 
could not executive compensation be subject to an objective and substantive 
reasonableness requirement because the executives who receive it (as opposed 
to those who make the decisions about it) are fiduciaries of entities who cannot 
receive unreasonable pay? 
The legal profession must promptly begin an earnest and meaningful con-
versation about the rise of a class of lawyer-employees within its midst and the 
rise of a lawyer-businessperson paradigm alongside its traditional lawyer-
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professional ideal. Nonlawyers should pay close attention and participate in this 
conversation not only as clients and as potential competitors, but as stakehold-
ers and parties in a broader exchange about the meaning of fiduciary duties and 
their interaction with market controls. 
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APPENDIX A–PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The proposed revisions to the Rules are italicized. 
 
In-house pay as “fee”: Rule 1.5 (a) and the Comment to Rule 1.5, or a new 
subsection in Rule 1.0(x). 
 
1.5(a) “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an un-
reasonable fee or compensation or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” 
 
[1] “Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees and forms of compen-
sation that are reasonable under the circumstances. The reasonableness re-
quirement applies to the compensation of in-house lawyers.” 
 
In the alternative, the ABA can leave Rule 1.5(a) and comment 1 intact and 
add to its terminology section, Rule 1.0, a new definition as follows: 
 
1.0(x) “Fee” denotes the payment for legal services provided by a lawyer 
to a client, including payment by an organizational client to its in-house coun-
sel in the form of salaries, bonuses, or nonmonetary benefits. 
 
Noncompete and stocks grants and options: Rule 5.6(a). 
 
5.6 A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: 
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar 
type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termina-
tion of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retire-
ment or an agreement concerning the grant of stock grants or stock options to 
in-house counsel as part of a compensation agreement subject to a reasonable 
noncompete provision. 
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